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Abstract
Many-to-many communication is a central component of widespread technologies like social
networks and the IoT. For many applications, it is desirable that the anonymity of communica-
tion participants is preserved. We focus on the protection of sender anonymity in peer-to-peer
networks that allow scalable group communication via publish-subscribe overlays. While DC-
nets can be used for achieving sender and receiver anonymity for many-to-many communica-
tion, they also induce a considerable communication and computation overhead. We address
this challenge by introducing a modified version of DC-nets that induces less overhead than
classical DC-nets while preserving their sender anonymity properties. Moreover, we present
challenges that arise when combining publish-subscribe overlays with DC-nets. We introduce
a novel technique that addresses the presented challenges, hereby protecting the anonymity
of senders during its initialization and runtime. As our approach allows for anonymization
groups of configurable size, we also analyze how groups that are suitable for this purpose can
be formed.
3

Zusammenfassung
Many-to-Many Kommunikation ist ein zentraler Bestandteil von weitverbreiteten Technologien
- beispielsweise von sozialen Netzwerken und dem IoT. Für viele Anwendungen ist es wün-
schenswert, dass die Anonymität der Kommunikationsteilnehmer geschützt wird. Wir konzen-
trieren uns auf den Schutz der Sender-Anonymität in Peer-to-Peer Netzwerken, in welchen
Publish-Subscribe Overlays eine skalierbare Gruppenkommunikation ermöglichen. Während
DC-Netzwerke genutzt werden können, um Sender- und Empfänger-Anonymität für Many-to-
Many Kommunikation zu erreichen, verursachen sie auch einen erheblichen kommunikativen
und rechnerischen Mehraufwand. Wir reagieren auf diese Herausforderung mit der Einführung
einer modifizierten Variante von DC-Netzwerken. Diese erzeugt einen geringeren Mehraufwand
als klassische DC-Netzwerke und behält gleichzeitig den Schutz der Sender-Anonymität bei.
Außerdem präsentieren wir Herausforderungen, die auftreten, wenn Publish-Subscribe Over-
lays mit DC-Netzwerken verbunden werden. Wir stellen eine neuartige Methode vor, die diese
Herausforderungen löst und somit die Anonymität von Sendern während ihrer Initialisierung
und Laufzeit schützt. Da unser Ansatz es ermöglicht, Gruppen konfigurierbarer Größe zur
Anonymisierung zu nutzen, analysieren wir auch, wie Gruppen gebildet werden können, die
für diese Aufgabe geeignet sind.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, more aspects of our daily life are connected to digital applications than ever before.
While, some decades ago, digital communication has been very costly, advances in network
technology made it affordable for the majority of the general population. With an increas-
ing number of people that have access to the Internet, more and more opportunities for so
called many-to-many communication arise. In contrast to traditional one-to-one communica-
tion, this communication model allows multiple senders and multiple receivers to interact with
each other. Hence, it is a central aspect of a variety of popular technologies, including social
networks like Twitter and Facebook, the Internet of Things (IoT) and “Smart Technologies”
like smart power grids and smart homes. With these technologies being part of our daily life,
many-to-many communication is already very relevant and will further increase in importance.
However, privacy is often forgotten despite its importance for the communication participants.
Nowadays, it is known that global governmental mass surveillance programs exist and pose
a constant threat to the privacy of the general population. While the existence of such pro-
grams was already suspected, it took many years for actual information to be available to the
public. For instance, the ECHELON [10] mass surveillance system has already been used for
more than two decades before its existence was confirmed by official documents in the early
2000s. Yet, it took until 2013 for the extent of western surveillance programs to come to light.
The classified documents leaked by Edward Snowden revealed a multitude [35] of global mass
surveillance programs invading the privacy of the general population. Stoycheff [45] indicated
that mass surveillance has a psychological effect on individuals and can discourage them from
voicing controversial opinions. This is in direct opposition to the principle of freedom of speech.
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the mass surveillance conducted
by GCHQ violated human rights [7]. However, governmental surveillance is not the only reason
for proper privacy protection as private information can easily fall into the wrong hands. For
instance, leaks of poorly secured information [39, 50, 20] and the sharing of private information
with third parties [9, 43] can have a severe impact on user privacy.
For demonstrating the importance of privacy protection, a basic definition of privacy is nec-
essary. We refrain from defining privacy due to the complexity of the topic and instead refer to
the following definition: Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others
[49]. To illustrate the importance of privacy, we now assume its complete absence. It has to
be assumed that everybody knows everything about someone and that everybody might use this
someones personal data in any way they want to. This is critical for multiple reasons. For one,
personal information can be used to influence and manipulate people into doing things that
they would otherwise not do. A prime example for this is targeted advertising [27] that heavily
relies on personal information. Furthermore, privacy becomes an important factor in the con-
text of oppressive governments. It enables people to give a voice to their opinions and beliefs
without having to fear political or religious persecution or persecution regarding other factors
of their identity. Hence, a world with the complete absence of privacy would be a dystopian
one. Fortunately we do not live in such a world. Still, there is often a lack of privacy that can be
more or less invasive.
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We focus on privacy in the ubiquitous context of digital communication. The encryption of
messages can protect the privacy of communication participants to some extent. However, the
content of messages is not the only aspect worthy of protection. Even if the actual content of a
message is not known to an adversary, it can still detect that certain participants communicate
with each other. This is very critical as it can have a direct impact on the privacy of the commu-
nication participants. For instance, oppressive governments may use such information to detect
potential supporters of political adversaries and persecute them. Therefore, receiver and sender
anonymity are very relevant for the privacy of users in digital communication.
We focus on the aspect of sender anonymity in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks as techniques
for reaching a sufficient level of receiver-anonymity in this setting have already been presented
[41, 48]. Furthermore, we focus on many-to-many communication. Past research resulted
in promising techniques for protecting sender anonymity in this setting, for instance, Dining
Cryptographers networks (DC-nets). However, they are problematic with regards to both their
communicational and computational overhead due to the extensive use of cover traffic (CT).
This overhead directly impacts the performance and scalability of the networks in which such
techniques are employed. As scalability is a crucial aspect for many-to-many communication,
we introduce Asymmetric Dining Cryptographers networks (ADC-nets) as modified version of
DC-nets with reduced overhead and comparable sender protection.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Required background and definitions are summarized
in Chapter 2 and related work referred to in Chapter 3. Our theoretical approach is introduced in
Chapter 4 and the respective prototypical implementation presented in Chapter 5. Afterwards,
both are evaluated in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.
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2 Background
In this chapter, relevant background information is introduced: First, we discuss different
types of network addressing in Section 2.1. Afterwards, we introduce a terminology regard-
ing anonymity in communication in Section 2.2. It is followed by the presentation of the
adversary model which is used throughout this thesis in Section 2.3. Then, the CT anonymiza-
tion technique is presented in Section 2.4. With Mix networks (Mix nets), a technique for the
anonymization of one-to-one communication is described in Section 2.5. As Mix nets are not
suitable for many-to-many communication, we rely on DC-nets that are presented in Section
2.6. In Section 2.7, the concept of group formation is introduced. Afterwards, the aspects of
overlays that are most relevant for this thesis are summarized in Section 2.8. Due to its impor-
tance for leader election, we refer to the byzantine generals problem in Section 2.9. Then, the
topic of leader elections in distributed systems is presented in Section 2.10. Final, we present
our assumptions regarding the underlying P2P network which is used throughout this thesis in
Section 2.11.
2.1 Network Addressing
While more techniques for network addressing exist, we focus on the main classes used for this
task:
• Most of the global network traffic is one-to-one communication and uses unicast address-
ing. While not designed for this purpose, unicast can also be used for one-to-many com-
munication by sending the same message multiple times, once for each receiver. However,
this results in additional overhead for both the sender and the network and is therefore
impractical.
• Multicast in turn allows to address a group of peers and is therefore predestined for one-
to-many communication. The sender only has to send each message once and messages
are efficiently delivered to all recipients by the network.
• While it was commonly used before multicast was widely available, broadcast is nowadays
a special case of multicast. It allows the addressing of all peers in a network and is therefore
designated for one-to-all communication. Furthermore, similar to multicast, the network
takes care of an efficient delivery of broadcast messages.
Many multicast and broadcast addressing implementations are not ensuring a reliable trans-
port of messages. However, various techniques that provide reliable multicast [19, 38, 8] and
reliable broadcast [11, 28] have been presented in past research. These techniques can be used
if the reliable transport of messages is crucial.
2.2 Anonymous Communication
Anonymity in the context of communication is a complex concept. We therefore rely on the
extensive terminology presented by Pfitzmann et al. [40] and summarize the aspects that are
13
most relevant for this thesis. Introductory, we refer to the following definition: Anonymity of a
subject from an attacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently identify the subject
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set [40].
Anonymity sets are useful for measuring the anonymity of subjects. In general, larger
anonymity sets make it harder for adversaries to identify a specific subject, hence resulting
in stronger anonymity. However, multiple subjects within an anonymity set can collude by ex-
changing information regarding their actions. Colluding subjects can use this information for
reducing the effective anonymity set size. This makes it easier for them to identify a non-
colluding subject within the anonymity set.
As Unlinkability is an important aspect of anonymity in a communication context, we also
refer to the following definition: Unlinkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., subjects,
messages, actions, ...) from an attacker’s perspective means that within the system (comprising
these and possibly other items), the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are
related or not [40].
By definition, the subjects of an anonymity set are indistinguishable from each other from the
view of an adversary. Therefore, communication technologies in which messages contain sender
and receiver addresses, prevent both sender and receiver anonymity. To achieve anonymity of
senders and receivers, messages have to be decoupled from sending and receiving subjects. Only
this way, senders and receivers cannot be linked to messages.
Anonymization techniques like Mix nets and DC-nets decouple the participants of a commu-
nication from messages and hence allow unlinkability. These techniques are presented in the
Sections 2.5 and 2.6.
2.3 Adversary Model
To evaluate the security aspects of existing techniques and our new approach, we formulate the
following assumptions regarding the capabilities of an adversary:
1. Global: has knowledge of all communication in the network.
2. Eavesdropping: can eavesdrop on every observed message.
3. Insider: can be part of the network and take part in the communication.
4. Colluding: can collude with other adversaries.
5. Non-disruptive: does not intentionally disrupt the communication.
We assume global and eavesdropping adversaries as this allows us to apply our approach to
networks that are monitored by adversaries. Such adversaries can read every message sent
over the network. Furthermore, they can detect the peer at which a certain message was first
forwarded. As this peer is the sender of the message, global and eavesdropping adversaries pose
a serious threat to sender anonymity. Also, we assume that insider adversaries exist and can
take part in the communication. This allows the application of our approach to P2P networks
with untrusted peers. Furthermore, we assume that adversaries can cooperate with each other
in situations where colluding allows them to gain an advantage over other peers. While the
first four assumptions present a realistic adversary model for P2P networks, the assumption
of adversaries being non-disruptive is problematic. In a real-world network, adversaries may
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willingly disrupt the communication between peers, for instance, by dropping messages and
inducing congestion. However, we do not focus on the aspect of disruption-prevention and
hence expect adversaries to be non-disruptive. Yet, we present challenges regarding disrupting
adversaries throughout this thesis and refer to existing techniques that address these challenges.
2.4 Cover Traffic
CT is an anonymization technique for reducing the linkability of senders and messages by adding
random noise to the communication. This can cover otherwise distinctive traffic patterns, thus
reducing the amount of information that an adversary can gain from observing a communi-
cation. Many techniques that can be used for achieving sender anonymity, e.g., Mix nets and
DC-nets, rely on CT as central component. However, CT often induces an enormous overhead
that heavily impacts the scalability of such technologies.
We now refer to past research in the field of CT:
• Levine et al. [34] analyzed the effectiveness of CT used in Mix nets as protective measure
against timing analysis attacks. They showed that certain timing analysis attacks can be
very effective against conventional CT. Furthermore, they proposed a new CT technique
that is more resilient to timing attacks.
• Mallesh et al. [37] proposed receiver-bound CT as technique for preventing statistical
disclosure attacks. It relies on Mixes sending CT that mimics the sending patterns of ac-
tual users. They showed that their technique can be beneficial with regards to sender
anonymity.
• Grube et al. [26] analyzed how the overhead caused by CT can be reduced. They eval-
uated the impact of different parameters on CT efficiency and anonymity. Furthermore,
they presented a technique that can drastically improve efficiency while maintaining a rea-
sonable level of anonymity. However, they also showed that this technique is susceptible
to intersection attacks that can be used by adversaries to reduce sender anonymity after
several messages have been emitted by the sender.
2.5 Mix Networks
Chaum [13] introduced the concept of Mixes and Mix nets that can be used for hiding the
identity of communication participants. Mix nets contain a number of Mixes that act as inter-
mediates between a number of peers communicating with each other.
A message sent over a series of Mixes is encrypted by the sender using multiple layers of
asymmetric cryptography to reduce the traceability of the message. For each Mix in the series,
a corresponding encryption layer is added to the message. When the message passes a Mix,
the corresponding encryption layer is removed from the message. In addition to the layered
encryption of messages, each Mix performs a number of steps for preventing the linking of a
message to both sender and receiver. Therefore, the actual receiver of a message can only link it
to the last Mix in the series but not to its actual sender. Furthermore, no Mix in the series knows
both the sender and the recipient of a message. Hence, even untrusted entities can be used as
Mixes. However, it has to be prevented that all Mixes in the series are controlled by the same
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adversary. Such an adversary has the capabilities to link each message sent over the series to its
sender and its receiver.
There are several applications that are based on the concept of Mix nets, for instance Tor [46]
and Java Anon Proxy [6] which is also known as JonDo. However, many of them are not real
Mix nets as they skip specific anonymization tasks in order to improve performance. While this
allows real-time communication, it also makes it easier for adversaries to attack the anonymity
of users of such applications. For instance, Bauer et al. [4] showed that optimizations applied
to Tor made it vulnerable to low-resource traffic analysis attacks.
Mix nets were designed for one-to-one communication. Their use in many-to-many commu-
nication is problematic as a new Mix route with new asymmetric keys has to be established for
each sender-receiver pair of the communication. In addition to the initialization overhead, the
sending of a message to multiple receivers is problematic. Each message has to be duplicated at
the sender to be encrypted and sent individually to each recipient over the individually estab-
lished Mix routes. This results in a computational and communication overhead that drastically
increases with the size of the communication group. Hence, using Mix nets for many-to-many
communication is infeasible.
2.6 Dining Cryptographers Networks
DC-nets were first introduced by Chaum [12] and can be used for preserving sender and receiver
anonymity in a many-to-many setting. Communication within DC-nets is split into rounds in
which each participant publishes a message by broadcasting it to the network. The contents of
these messages are protected against eavesdropping adversaries by an encryption scheme that is
explained in Section 2.6.2. Furthermore, the length of all messages is the same and previously
agreed upon. Hereby, an anonymity set comprising all participants of the DC-net is maintained.
The encryption scheme used by DC-nets relies on cryptographic secrets that are established
pair-wise among the DC-net participants. We present the establishment of these secrets as part
of an initialization phase in Section 2.6.1. Afterwards, we describe the communication model of
DC-nets in Section 2.6.2. In Section 2.6.3, we discuss the security of DC-nets. Final, we present
a number of challenges that are associated with DC-nets in Section 2.6.4.
2.6.1 Initialization
Each DC-net participant requires a pair-wise secret for each other participant in the DC-net for
each round of communication. As each secret is only used for one round, we refer to them
as round secrets. Furthermore, the length of each round secret has to be equal to the message
length used for DC-net communication due to the way they are used.
While it is possible to establish each round secret with an own key agreement, it is more
convenient to establish one master secret per pair of DC-nets participants and use it for the
generation of round secrets. Hence, pair-wise master secrets among the DC-net participants are
established in an initial key agreement phase. After this phase, every participant shares a master
secret with each other participant in the network.
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Example 2.6.1: Master Secret Establishment
Given a DC-net with a participant set P = {A,B,C} and a secure key agreement protocol
(e.g., Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH) [44]) that produces a master secret msXY for
the participants X ,Y ∈ P. For simplicity, assume that the function ka(X ,Y ) = msXY rep-
resents the key agreement between the participants X and Y in which they agree on msXY .
Scenario: A, B and C establish their master secrets.
A : msAB = ka(A,B) and msAC = ka(A,C)
B : msAB = ka(A,B) and msBC = ka(B,C)
C : msAC = ka(A,C) and msBC = ka(B,C)
Traditionally, each master secret is split into a number of round secrets. Hereby, only a finite
number of round secrets can be obtained from each master secret. Therefore, this approach
is problematic with regards to usability as the communication is limited to a finite number of
rounds. However, it is also possible to use the master secrets as seeds for cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generators (CSPRNGs). Hereby, an arbitrary number of round
secrets can be dynamically generated. However, as shown in Section 2.6.3, this is not as secure
as the traditional approach.
Example 2.6.2: Round Secret Derivation
Given a DC-net with the participants A, B and C, the master secrets msAB =
11000100,msAC = 00101010 and msBC = 01010100. Assume a CSPRNG CS and a
message length of 4 to be publicly known. Furthermore, assume rsXY,r as round secret
for round r that was derived using the master secret msXY . For simplicity, assume that CS
can be used as CS(msXY , r) = rsXY,r and returns the first four digits of msXY if r is even
and the last four digits of msXY otherwise.
Scenario 1: A, B and C compute as many round secrets as possible using the traditional
approach:
Participants Round 1 Round 2
A and B rsAB,1 = 1100 rsAB,2 = 0100
A and C rsAC ,1 = 0010 rsAC ,2 = 1010
B and C rsBC ,1 = 0101 rsBC ,2 = 0100
More round secrets cannot be computed.
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Scenario 2: A, B and C compute the round secrets for the first four rounds using the
CSPRNG CS:
Participants Round 1 Round 2
A and B rsAB,1 = CS(msAB, 1) = 0100 rsAB,2 = CS(msAB, 2) = 1100
A and C rsAC ,1 = CS(msAC , 1) = 1010 rsAC ,2 = CS(msAC , 2) = 0010
B and C rsBC ,1 = CS(msBC , 1) = 0100 rsBC ,2 = CS(msBC , 2) = 0101
Participants Round 3 Round 4
A and B rsAB,3 = CS(msAB, 3) = 0100 rsAB,4 = CS(msAB, 4) = 1100
A and C rsAC ,3 = CS(msAC , 3) = 1010 rsAC ,4 = CS(msAC , 4) = 0010
B and C rsBC ,3 = CS(msBC , 3) = 0100 rsBC ,4 = CS(msBC , 4) = 0101
An arbitrary number of round secrets can be computed.
2.6.2 Communication
As already mentioned in the introduction, the communication within DC-nets is split into rounds
in which each participant publishes a message by broadcasting it to the network. As eavesdrop-
ping adversaries can link these messages to their senders, their content is encrypted using the
DC-net encryption scheme. We refer to the encrypted messages as DC-net messages and to the
content that is encrypted as secret messages.
The DC-net encryption scheme allows the distribution of one secret message per round. This
is realized as follows: Each participant creates a DC-net message by XORing a secret message
with all the round secrets of this participant for the current round. The secret message can
either be empty or contain actual content that the participant wants to publish via the DC-net.
DC-net messages constructed from empty secret messages hereby function as CT.
Assuming that only one participant published a non-empty secret message, this secret message
can be extracted by XORing all DC-net messages of the round. The challenge of multiple non-
empty secret messages being published in the same round is addressed in Section 2.6.4.
Example 2.6.3: DC-net En-/Decryption
Given a DC-net with the participants A, B and C with rsAB = 10001011, rsAC = 10111001
and rsBC = 00110101 as 8-bit round secrets for the current round.
Scenario 1: A wants to distribute a secret message mA = 11111000 and both B and C
send empty secret messages.
The following DC-net messages are computed and broadcasted:
cA = mA⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsAC = 11001010
cB = rsAB ⊕ rsBC = 10111110
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cC = rsAC ⊕ rsBC = 10001100
Every participant can then decrypt the secret message published by A:
cA⊕ cB ⊕ cC = 11111000= mA
Scenario 2: A, B and C send empty DC-net messages.
The following DC-net messages are computed and broadcasted:
cA = rsAB ⊕ rsAC = 00110010
cB = rsAB ⊕ rsBC = 10111110
cC = rsAC ⊕ rsBC = 10001100
Every participants can then XOR the received DC-net messages and see that only an empty
message was published:
cA⊕ cB ⊕ cC = 00000000
2.6.3 Security
As new round secrets are used for each round, each DC-net message is effectively a one-time
pad (OTP) [44]. As OTPs exhibit perfect security, it is impossible for adversaries to decrypt them
by using cryptanalysis without background information regarding the used round secret. With
the traditional approach for the generation of round secrets, the randomly generated master
secrets are split into multiple round secrets. Therefore, it is impossible for adversaries to decrypt
DC-net messages unless they have further knowledge regarding the master secrets or the round
secrets for specific rounds. However, when using the master secrets as seeds for a CSPRNG, the
round secrets are only random to a certain extent and the exchanged DC-net messages therefore
not perfectly secure. Instead, the security depends on the security of the used CSPRNG.
While still not perfectly secure, reestablishing the master secrets in regular intervals and
using them as new seeds for the CSPRNG might increase the complexity of DC-net message
cryptanalysis. However, even if perfectly secure against outsiders, insider adversaries pose a
threat to the security of DC-nets as they can
• reduce the effective size of the DC-net anonymity set by colluding with other insiders,
• impersonate honest participants if they control all the communication links over which
honest participants can communicate with the rest of the DC-net and
• fake a larger anonymity set size by pretending to be connected to participants that do not
actually exist.
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2.6.4 Challenges
While DC-nets exhibit overall desirable security properties, a number of challenges exist.
Overhead
DC-nets introduce a massive communicational overhead due to the extensive use of CT. While
every participant has to send a DC-net message, only one secret message can be exchanged
per round. Furthermore, several XOR operations have to be executed for each DC-net round,
resulting in a significant computational overhead. In Section 6.2.2, we compare the overhead
of DC-nets to ADC-nets, which we introduce in Section 4.4.
Collisions
Due to missing medium access control (MAC), multiple non-empty secret messages may collide
in DC-nets with multiple sending participants. Every participant is allowed to send a non-empty
secret message in any round and without any coordination. Therefore, it is possible that multiple
participants send non-empty secret messages in the same round, resulting in a collision of those
secret messages. This is problematic as most collisions result in a malformed combination of the
non-empty secret messages. Only in few cases, one of the secret messages survives a collision.
Example 2.6.4: DC-net Collisions
Given a DC-net with the participants A, B and C with rsAB = 10001011, rsAC = 10111001
and rsBC = 00110101 as 8-bit round secrets for the current round.
Scenario 1: A wants to distribute the secret message mA = 11111000, B wants to
distribute the secret message mB = 01000100 and C sends an empty secret message.
The following DC-net messages are computed and sent via broadcast:
cA = mA⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsAC = 11001010
cB = mB ⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsBC = 11111010
cC = rsAC ⊕ rsBC = 10001100
The secret messages sent by A and B resulted in a collision:
cA⊕ cB ⊕ cC = 10111100= mA⊕mB
Scenario 2: A wants to distribute the secret message mA = 11111000 and both B and C
want to distribute the secret message mB = mC = 01000100.
The following DC-net messages are computed and sent via broadcast:
cA = mA⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsAC = 11001010
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cB = mB ⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsBC = 11111010
cC = mC ⊕ rsAC ⊕ rsBC = 11001000
The secret messages sent by B and C cancel each other out. Hence, the secret message
sent by A survived the collision:
cA⊕ cB ⊕ cC = 11111000= mA⊕mB ⊕mC = mA
While we do not focus on collision detection, we implemented a straightforward collision
handling technique for the ADC-net communication of our framework implementation pre-
sented in Chapter 5. This technique is presented in Section 5.3.7 and evaluated in Section
6.5. Furthermore, we refer to Section 3.2 for protocols that use slot reservation techniques to
prevent the occurrence of collisions.
Disruption
DC-nets are prone to both unintended and planned disruptions. Insider adversaries can easily
disrupt the communication of a DC-net by
• omitting DC-net messages and
• provoking collisions by constantly sending non-empty secret messages.
Example 2.6.5: DC-net Disruption
Given a DC-net with the participants A, B and C with rsAB = 10001011, rsAC = 10111001
and rsBC = 00110101 as 8-bit round secrets for the current round. Assume that C is an
insider adversary whose goal is the disruption of the communication.
Scenario 1: A wants to distribute the secret message mA = 11111000, B sends an empty
secret message and C does not send a message.
The following DC-net messages are computed and sent via broadcast:
cA = mA⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsAC = 11001010
cB = rsAB ⊕ rsBC = 10111110
The secret message sent by A cannot be restored because C refused to send an empty
secret message:
cA⊕ cB = 01110100 ̸= mA
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Scenario 2: A wants to distribute the secret message mA = 11111000, B sends an empty
secret message and C sends a random secret message mC = 01111000.
The following DC-net messages are computed and sent via broadcast:
cA = mA⊕ rsAB ⊕ rsAC = 11001010
cB = rsAB ⊕ rsBC = 11111010
cC = mC ⊕ rsAC ⊕ rsBC = 11110100
The secret message sent by A cannot be restored because C provoked a collision:
cA⊕ cB ⊕ cC = 11000100 ̸= mA
The disruption of the communication by insider adversaries is critical. However, we do not
address this challenge in this thesis and instead refer to past research regarding disruption-
prevention in Section 3.1.
2.7 Group Formation
Groups are a ubiquitous concept that does not only apply to network theory. Humans both wit-
tingly or unwittingly form groups for all kinds of reasons, be it for sharing means of transporta-
tion or engaging in shared hobbies. Groups in networks are also created for specific purposes
and are therefore based on different aspects. Mobile ad-hoc networks [36] for instance, can be
seen as groups that are formed based on the locality of nearby mobile devices. While many more
techniques for forming groups exist, we focus on flooding and random walks, two approaches
that are applicable in P2P networks. Furthermore, we only summarize these approaches shortly
and refer to Gkantsidis et al. [22] for a more detailed presentation and comparison of both
approaches:
• Flooding can be used for sending group participation requests to all peers in a network.
While it is very robust, it can easily lead to congestion in the network due to the high
number of messages being sent.
• Random Walks randomly traverse a graph and can be used for a more coordinated distri-
bution of group participation requests. While random walks generally incur less commu-
nication overhead than flooding, they also take longer.
2.8 Overlays
Overlays are “networks” build up on top of other network layers, e.g., the IP layer. They connect
a subgroup of the members of underlying layers on a new abstraction layer. Addressing of the
overlay members is often done on this new abstraction layer. Furthermore, communication links
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Figure 2.1.: Overlay Example
between the members of an overlay may differ from those of the underlying layer. An exemplary
overlay is shown in Figure 2.1.
As overlays have been analyzed thoroughly in past research, we refrain from describing them
in detail and rather focus on the aspects that are most relevant for this thesis. Interest-related
overlays are described in Section 2.8.1. In Section 2.8.2, the aspect of overlay establishment is
addressed.
2.8.1 Interest-related Overlays
Interest-related overlays have a certain topic assigned to them in which all participants of the
overlay are interested in. They are based on the publish-subscribe (pub-sub) [17] scheme and
can be seen as communication groups in which messages regarding a certain interest are ex-
changed. For this thesis, we assume that every peer in a network can at any time
• initiate a new overlay,
• join any existing overlay and
• leave any overlay it is part of.
Furthermore, we refer to interest-related overlays as overlays throughout this thesis.
2.8.2 Overlay Establishment
The common goal of overlay establishment techniques is the determination of an efficient distri-
bution tree that connects a specific group of peers and therefore allows for message distribution
on the overlay. What technique is most suitable for overlay establishment heavily depends on
the purpose of the established overlay. While we do not focus on overlay establishment, we
briefly discuss existing privacy-friendly overlay establishment techniques in Section 3.3.
2.9 Byzantine Generals Problem
The Byzantine Generals Problem [32] describes the challenge of reaching multi-party agree-
ments when parties can only communicate with each other over unreliable channels. The
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complexity of this challenge is further increased by the existence of malicious entities that
try to manipulate this process, for instance, by sending conflicting information to different
parties. While different techniques can be used to address the problem, we do not describe
them in detail and instead refer to the use of signatures as described by Lamport et al. [32]. By
using this approach, it can be ensured that no party can send conflicting information to different
parties without being detected.
2.10 Leader Election
Distributed systems often require entities that assume a leading role, for instance, for the co-
ordination of tasks. The field of leader election addresses the challenge of selecting such an
entity from a set of candidates. Due to the thorough research in the field, a multitude of leader
election algorithms exists. We focus on election algorithms that are conducted in a distributed
manner and elect exactly one leader. For instance, the Bully Election Algorithm [21] can be
used for electing a single coordinating entity in a distributed system.
Many leader election algorithms function comparable to political elections where a leader
is elected from a set of candidates based on the number of votes casted for each candidate.
Yet, in some scenarios it is desirable that a leader is randomly chosen from a set of candidates.
While this poses no challenge for distributed systems with a trusted entity that can randomly
select a leader from the set of candidates, it is a difficult task for systems without such a trusted
entity. Traditional leader elections algorithms, which elect a leader based on the number of
votes, allow colluding adversarial candidates to cast their votes for one of their peers, hereby
effectively manipulating the election.
Example 2.10.1: Traditional Leader Election
Given a set C = {1,2,3, 4,5, 6,7} of candidates that take part in an election. Assume, that
non-colluding candidates randomly select one of the candidates and that the candidate
with the most votes is elected as leader. Furthermore, assume that the candidates 1, 2
and 3 are colluding.
Scenario: Traditional Election
Candidate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Voted for 3 3 3 4 7 4 6 ⇒ Elected Leader: 3
Distributed elections are effectively multi-party agreements. Therefore, the byzantine gen-
erals problem presented in Section 2.9 applies and has to be addressed. We focus on election
schemes that prevent both non-colluding and colluding adversarial candidates from gaining an
unfair advantage and refer to these schemes as robust.
Ben-Or et al. [5] introduced the collective coin-flipping problem as potential way of using coin-
flipping for robust leader election. Based on this problem, Feige [18] presented the Lightest
Bin (LB) protocol that makes it harder for both non-colluding and colluding adversaries to
manipulate the election of a leader to their advantage. While it already grants certain guarantees
regarding the prevention of adversarial influence, it is also comparably simple. Therefore, we
use a slightly modified version of the LB protocol for our theoretical approach and present
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it in Section 4.4.1. It can be exchanged with more complex versions of the LB protocol that
grant enhanced guarantees, for instance the protocol proposed by King et al. [30]. It improves
the scalability of the LB protocol and guarantees the election of a good leader with a positive
constant probability if less than one third of the candidates are adversarial. Furthermore, Kapron
et al. [29] presented an asynchronous protocol that is based on the LB protocol and resilient to
adversarial message scheduling.
2.11 Assumptions
We now introduce the assumptions on which we base our theoretical approach and the imple-
mentation. We refer to the underlying P2P network as the underlay as it interconnects all peers
in the network. We formulate the following assumptions regarding the underlay:
• Reachability: The underlay is a connected graph.
• No Churn: No peer disconnects from the network.
• Perfect Communication: No packets are lost.
• Authenticity: All packets are authenticated.
Reachability ensures that the underlay is not partitioned, hence allowing communication be-
tween any pair of peers. No churn and perfect communication prevent the disruption of DC-nets
by disconnecting peers and messages being lost. For a real-world application, perfect communi-
cation can be achieved by using reliable communication protocols, for instance, TCP for unicast
and one of the techniques presented in Section 2.1 for multicast and broadcast communication.
Authenticity prevents adversaries from impersonating other peers. As mentioned in Section 2.9,
this also makes it impossible for adversaries to send conflicting information to different peers
without it being detectable. Authenticity can be achieved in a real-world application by using
unforgeable and verifiable signatures.
We introduce the usage of the following terms to prevent confusion:
• peer: a member of the underlay.
• participant: a member of a specified group (e.g., overlay, election and ADC-net).
We assume that each peer is neighbor-aware and hence knows all adjacent peers. This allows
us to form groups by using distributed graph traversal. Furthermore, we assume that each peer
can be interested in a number of topics. This is necessary for using interest-related overlays.
While not actively sending or receiving messages, peers with empty interest sets can support
anonymization techniques like ADC-nets by increasing the anonymity set size.
2.11. Assumptions 25

3 Related Work
In this chapter, we present past work that is related to our research. First, in Section 3.1, we
refer to techniques that can be used for increasing the disruption-resilience of classical DC-nets.
Then, in Section 3.2, we present protocols for anonymous communication that rely on DC-nets
and address a number of challenges, including the ones presented in Section 2.6.4. Final, in
Section 3.3, we refer to techniques for establishing overlays in a privacy-friendly manner.
3.1 DC-net Disruption Resilience
Waidner et al. [47] presented a protocol which achieves the goals of DC-nets under weaker
assumptions. Furthermore, they showed that the DC-net disruption countermeasure proposed
by Chaum [12] can be used by adversaries to evict non-adversarial participants from the com-
munication. They presented improved protocols which prevent this attack.
Golle et al. [24] presented two protocols that can be used for detecting and identifying
disrupting DC-net participants. Their protocols can be used for achieving full fault recovery from
collisions induced by disrupting participants at a comparably low overhead of one additional
broadcast round. Hereby, they increase the disruption-resilience of classical DC-nets.
3.2 DC-net Protocols
Goel et al. presented the Herbivore [23] protocol which addresses the DC-net overhead chal-
lenge. Instead of running one DC-net comprising all network peers, the network is partitioned
into a number of cliques in which DC-nets are run. To prevent collisions, a reservation phase
is used in which transmissions slots are assigned to the DC-net participants. They showed that
their approach reduces the overhead induced by DC-nets and is also resilient to a number of
critical attacks.
Corrigan-Gibbs et al. presented the Dissent [14] protocol which can be used for anonymous
communication in groups with previously known members. It uses DC-nets for preplanned
communication rounds in which collisions only occur if intentionally induced by adversarial
participants. Such participants can be identified when they disrupt the communication and can
then be evicted from groups.
3.3 Privacy-friendly Overlay Establishment
The pub-sub [17] scheme enables scalable group communication by decoupling senders and
recipients of messages. Daubert et al. [15] formulated a number of privacy requirements for
pub-sub systems and introduced a privacy-friendly overlay establishment technique. Their ap-
proach does not rely on a central trusted entity, hence allowing its application in P2P networks.
Grube et al. [25] introduced an approach for establishing pub-sub overlays using ant colony
optimizations [16]. Their approach allows for a configurable trade-off between efficiency and
privacy protection. They showed that this can be used for bridging the gap between privacy and
efficiency.
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4 Theoretical Approach
4.1 Introduction
The challenge being addressed in this thesis is the protection of sender-anonymity in a layered
P2P network with many-to-many communication. We rely on the adversary model introduced
in Section 2.3 and the assumptions formulated in Section 2.11.
This chapter is structured as follows: The traditional overlay approach and challenges with
regards to sender protection are presented in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we show how DC-nets
can be used in combination with overlays to address one of these challenges but at the same
time introduces a number of new challenges. In Section 4.4, we present ADC-nets as modified
version of DC-nets with reduced overhead. Final, in Section 4.5, we show how ADC-nets can be
used in combination with overlays for solving the remaining challenges.
4.2 Traditional Overlay Approach
With the traditional overlay approach, a peer that wants to send a message is either already part
of an overlay, joins an existing one or initiates a new one. As soon as it is part of the overlay, it
can send messages to receivers on the overlay. This approach is highly problematic in terms of
sender protection against our adversary model and leaves us with the following challenges:
1. Sender Identification: An adversary can identify the sender of the message by determining
where the message was first forwarded.
2. Overlay Interaction Observation: An adversary can observe who joined or initiated an over-
lay directly before a message was sent over this overlay. This peer is with high probability
the sender of the message.
Therefore, the traditional overlay approach grants no sender protection against our adversary
model.
4.3 Overlays with DC-nets
The sender identification challenge introduced in Section 4.2 can be addressed by using DC-nets
on top of overlays as shown in Figure 4.1. This way, overlay participants can use the DC-net
for sending messages to receivers on this overlay. Hereby, eavesdropping adversaries cannot
identify the sender of such messages. However, new challenges arise:
3. DC-net Initialization Observation: The DC-net has to be initiated by a peer. We assume that
this peer initiates the DC-net because it wants to send a message. Hence, we encounter the
same problems as for the overlay interaction observation challenge presented in Section
4.2.
4. Overhead: The enormous overhead of DC-nets has to be reduced before they can be prac-
tically used.
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Figure 4.1.: Overlay with DC-net for sender protection.
5. Overlay Churn: DC-nets are not designed for dynamically joining and leaving participants.
A DC-net has to be disbanded and newly created for every peer that joins or leaves the
overlay on which the DC-net is running.
6. Anonymity Set Size Limitation: The anonymity set size of DC-nets is limited by the number
of overlay participants. It may therefore be very small for less popular interests.
Furthermore, it should be noted that classical DC-nets rely on broadcast for message distribu-
tion. While this can also be used for this model, it may be a viable alternative to use multicast
addressing in order to only address a subset of all peers, more specifically, the overlay members.
4.4 ADC-nets
We introduce a modified version of DC-nets that contain a rendezvous point (RP). A RP is a
regular DC-net participant with additional tasks, namely
1. being the sole receiver of all DC-net messages of the DC-net,
2. decrypting the published secret messages and
3. forwarding them to their recipients that are not necessarily part of the DC-net.
We refer to DC-nets that contain a RP as ADC-nets due to the asymmetric message flow between
the RP and the other participants. As published secret messages are sent to their recipients with-
out protecting the anonymity of these recipients, receiver anonymity is not given for ADC-nets.
The structure of this section is as follows: First, in Section 4.4.1, we present how RPs can be
elected. In Section 4.4.2, we present the communication model of ADC-nets and compare it to
the one of DC-nets. While, this model reduces the overall communicational and computational
overhead, we also show that certain problems are associated with it. Final, in Section 4.4.3, we
discuss the possibilities of disbanding and pausing ADC-nets for further overhead reduction.
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4.4.1 Rendezvous Point Election
In contrast to classical DC-nets, ADC-nets require the election of a RP before the actual com-
munication can begin. Apart from this additional task, the initialization phase of ADC-nets is
comparable to the one of DC-nets.
We formulate the following assumptions regarding the setting in which RP elections take
place:
• Several peers have formed a group, for instance, by using the approach presented in Sec-
tion 4.5.2, and initialize a new ADC-net for this group.
• Each of these peers knows every other peer in the group.
Prior to presenting the election scheme, we show the dangers of adversarial RPs. They can
• eavesdrop on published secret messages,
• modify messages before forwarding them and
• drop messages instead of forwarding them.
The problem of eavesdropping RPs is comparable to the problem of eavesdropping DC-net par-
ticipants. It can be prevented by adding a layer of encryption to secret messages that can only
be removed by recipients who know the decryption key.
Detecting the modification of messages is a new challenge that emerges when using ADC-nets
instead of classical DC-nets. A RP cannot be prevented from modifying messages before for-
warding them. However, it is possible to sign secret messages with a personal private key before
adding an anti-eavesdropping encryption layer around it. Hereby, recipients can verify that a
message came from a certain participant and was not modified in transit. However, adversarial
recipients can use the signature to identify the sender of the message. Therefore, this technique
is problematic with regards to sender anonymity and should only be used if all recipients are
trusted.
Dropping of messages can be categorized as communication disruption. A RP can completely
disrupt the communication by simply refraining from forwarding messages. We leave this chal-
lenge to future work as we do not focus on the aspect of disruption prevention.
The presented challenges makes the election of a honest ADC-net participant as RP desirable.
Hence, the RP election should be robust and prevent both colluding and non-colluding adver-
sarial participants from gaining an unfair advantage. At the same time, it is desirable to take
certain aspects, e.g., the location of ADC-net participants in the underlay, into account. How-
ever, the inclusion of such aspects could be exploited by adversaries to boost the probability of
them being elected as RP. Therefore, we use a randomized approach that is based on the LB
[18] protocol.
A non-distributed version of our approach is presented by Algorithm 1. When executed in a
distributed manner, each candidate c ∈ C of the current round sends its vote to all other election
participants, for instance, by using reliable multicast as presented in Section 2.1. Each election
participant computes the candidate set for the next round after receiving all votes of the current
round. If the new candidate set only contains one candidate, this candidate is elected as RP.
Using such a randomized approach is suitable with regards to sender anonymity as the out-
come of an election is independent from the elected RP being a sender or not. Adversaries
therefore cannot draw conclusions about a RP being a sender or not.
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Algorithm 1 RP Election
C ⇐ PART IC I PANTS ▷ set containing the current candidates
while |C |> 1 do
C0 ⇐ {} ▷ 0-voting candidates
C1 ⇐ {} ▷ 1-voting candidates
for all c ∈ C do
if random(0,1) == 0 then
C0.add(c)
else
C1.add(c)
end if
end for
if |C0|> 0 and |C1|> 0 then ▷ candidates can only be eliminated if not unanimous
if |C0| ≤ |C |2 then
C ⇐ C0
else
C ⇐ C1
end if
end if
end while
{RP} ⇐ C
Example 4.4.1: RP Election
Given a set C = {1,2,3, 4,5, 6,7, 8} of candidates that take part in a RP election.
Scenario 1: Fastest Election
Round C C0 C1
1 {1,2,3,4, 5,6, 7,8} {1,2,4,5, 6,7, 8} {3} ⇒ Elected RP: 3
Scenario 2: Slowest Election (without unanimous rounds)
Round C C0 C1
1 {1,2,3,4, 5,6, 7,8} {1,6,7,8} {2,3,4,5}
2 {1,6,7,8} {6,8} {1,7}
3 {6,8} {6} {8} ⇒ Elected RP: 6
Scenario 3: Election with Unanimous Rounds
Round C C0 C1
1 {1,2,3,4, 5,6, 7,8} {1,3,6,7, 8} {2,4,5}
2 {2,4,5} {} {2,4,5}
3 {2,4,5} {2} {4,5}
4 {4,5} {4,5} {}
5 {4,5} {5} {4} ⇒ Elected RP: 5
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4.4.2 Communication
In contrast to DC-nets, ADC-net messages are not broadcasted to all peers in the network.
Instead, every participant only sends its ADC-net messages to the RP of the ADC-net. The
RP then decrypts the messages published in the ADC-net and forwards them to their actual
recipients. This reduces both the number of messages sent and the number of XOR operations
executed per round. This addresses the overhead challenge.
Assuming only one active sender per ADC-net, collisions, as presented in Section 2.6.4, do not
occur and therefore do not pose a challenge for this communication model. However, when used
with multiple senders, regular participants cannot detect anymore whether their messages were
part of a collision as only the RP knows the published secret message of each round. This can
be addressed by having the RP distribute the published secret messages not only to their actual
recipients but also to all participants of the ADC-net. This results in additional communicational
overhead that can be minimized by distributing the published messages via multicast. As shown
in Section 6.2.2, even with collision detection, ADC-nets induce significantly less communication
overhead than DC-nets.
4.4.3 Transiency
As shown in Section 6.2.2, the optimizations presented in Section 4.4.2 significantly reduce the
overhead induced by DC-net CT. However, when compared to using no sender protection, each
round still induces a considerable overhead. Especially when running over long periods of time
and with only few non-empty secret messages being sent, the utilization of ADC-nets may be
very low.
We propose the following techniques for reducing the overhead induced by ADC-nets that are
not sufficiently utilized:
• Pausing: ADC-nets can be paused by temporarily stopping the computation and sending
of ADC-net messages. Paused ADC-nets can be resumed, for instance, after a previously
defined timespan.
• Disbanding: ADC-nets can be disbanded by permanently stopping the computation and
sending of ADC-net messages. Furthermore, all information regarding the ADC-net, includ-
ing cryptographic secrets, are deleted. Hence, disbanded ADC-nets cannot be resumed. We
refer to ADC-nets that can be disbanded as transient.
While we discuss both techniques, we only implement and evaluate transient behavior and leave
the practical evaluation of pausing to future work.
A number of challenges arise when using pausing and disbanding:
• Low Utilization Detection: A low ADC-net utilization has to be detected before pausing/dis-
banding can be initiated for the ADC-net.
• Coordination: ADC-net participants have to be informed of pausing/disbanding.
• Transition Phase: Pausing/Disbanding should only commence after a reasonable transition
period in which the ADC-net participants can prepare for it.
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Figure 4.2.: Overlay with ADC-net for sender protection.
A variety of techniques for detecting a low ADC-net utilization are thinkable. We propose the
following approach: The RP continuously measures the number of consecutive rounds in which
only empty secrets messages were published. Hereby, it is predestined as coordinating entity
and can initiate pausing/disbanding as soon as a certain threshold is exceeded. In Section 6.6,
we analyze the impact of different threshold settings on the time until ADC-nets are disbanded.
The transition period before an ADC-net is paused/disbanded should be long enough to allow
its participants to finish publishing their last messages. Messages that were not successfully
published during the transition phase are most likely delayed. They can only be sent after the
paused ADC-net is resumed or using another ADC-net if the original ADC-net was disbanded.
4.5 Overlays with ADC-nets
In this section, we introduce a new model that addresses the challenges introduced in the Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3. We use ADC-nets as intermediate layer between the underlay and multiple
overlays instead of running DC-nets on specific overlays. An exemplary visualization of the
model can be seen in Figure 4.2.
As shown in Section 6.2.2, ADC-nets induce less overhead than DC-nets. Hence, the overhead
challenge is addressed by using ADC-nets instead of classical DC-nets.
We decouple ADC-net participants from overlay participants by using ADC-nets as intermedi-
ate layer between underlay and overlays. This decoupling addresses the overlay churn and the
anonymity set size limitation challenges but at the same time introduces a new challenge:
7. Group Formation: Suitable ADC-net groups have to be formed.
The structure of this section is as follows: In Section 4.5.1, we discuss different ADC-net
initialization techniques and address the DC-net initialization observation challenge which also
applies to ADC-nets. Afterwards, we present our approach for setting up suitable groups in
Section 4.5.2 and hereby address the group formation challenge. In Section 4.5.3, we address
the overlay interaction observation challenge by using the RPs of ADC-nets as proxies for overlay
interactions. Final, we present an example of the model in Section 4.5.4.
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4.5.1 ADC-net Initialization
By definition, the DC-net initialization observation challenge introduced in Section 4.3 also
applies to ADC-nets. Before addressing this challenge, we introduce the concept of capacity due
to its relevance for our approach: We assume that each peer can take part in multiple ADC-nets
at the same time. However, the participation in each ADC-net results in both communicational
and computational overhead for a peer, especially if it is elected as RP. Therefore, peers can
quickly be overloaded when the number of ADC-nets they can simultaneously take part in, is
not limited. Hence, each peer is able to configure a capacity that limits the number of ADC-nets
it can simultaneously participate in.
We address the DC-net/ADC-net initialization observation challenge by using a randomized
approach for the initialization of ADC-nets. It can be configured using the following parameters:
• Capacity: the capacity of the peer.
• Interval: the interval in which the initialization check is executed.
• Probability: the probability for initializing a new ADC-net.
The approach is presented by Algorithm 2 and is executed individually on each peer. We now
explain each phase:
• Continuous Loop: The peer periodically runs the initialization check.
• Initialization Check: The peer checks whether it has the capacities to initialize a new
ADC-net. If it has and if the probability check succeeds, the peer initiates a new ADC-net.
Algorithm 2 Randomized ADC-net Initialization
Â {Phase: Continuous Loop}
while True do
→ {Phase: Initialization Check}
sleep(interv al)
end while
Â {Phase: Initialization Check}
if hasCapaci t ies(peer) then
if random()< probabil i t y then
ini t iateADCNetGroupSetup()
end if
end if
With this approach, the initialization of ADC-nets is randomized and independent from whether
a peer wants to send a message. Hence, for each message sent through the ADC-net, the prob-
ability of it being sent by the ADC-net initiator is equal to it being sent by another ADC-net
participant. This solves the DC-net/ADC-net initialization observation challenge.
4.5.2 Group Setup
The purpose of the group setup phase is the formation of a group of peers, for instance, by using
one of the techniques presented in Section 2.7. It is required that each group participant knows
every other group participant after the group setup phase. Only then can a RP be elected using
the approach presented in Section 4.4.1.
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Algorithm 3 Group Setup Technique
Â {Configuration}
GSM ⇐ GROUP_SIZE_MIN IMUM
GST ⇐ GROUP_SIZE_TARGET
Â {Phase: Initialization}
peer ⇐ GROUP_SETUP_IN I T IATOR
path⇐ [peer]
v isi ted ⇐ [peer]
par t icipants⇐ [peer]
→ Phase: Forward Request
Â {Phase: Forward Request}
cands⇐ {n | n ∈ neigh(peer)∧ n /∈ v isi ted}
if |cands|> 0 then
peer ⇐ randomChoice(cands)
→ Phase: Handle Request
else
path.pop()
if |path|> 0 then
peer ⇐ path.pop()
→ Phase: Handle Request
else
if |par t icipants| ≥ GSM then
→ Phase: Finish Setup
else
→ Phase: Cancel Setup
end if
end if
end if
Â {Phase: Handle Request}
path.append(peer)
if peer /∈ v isi ted then
v isi ted.append(peer)
if hasCapaci t ies(peer) then
par t icipants.append(peer)
end if
end if
if |par t icipants|== GST then
peer ⇐ path[0]
→ Phase: Finish Setup
else
→ Phase: Forward Request
end if
Â {Phase: Finish Setup}
for all p ∈ par t icipants do
notifyFinish(p, par t icipants)
end for
Â {Phase: Cancel Setup}
for all p ∈ par t icipants do
notifyCancel(p)
end for
We now present a group setup technique which is comparably simple, fulfills the group setup
requirements and therefore addresses the group formation challenge. To allow for a config-
urable anonymity set size, we introduce the following parameters that define a range of accept-
able group sizes:
• Group Size Minimum: the minimum number of group participants required for a group
setup to succeed.
• Group Size Target: the desired number of group participants.
The approach is presented by Algorithm 3. We now explain each phase:
• Initialization: The group setup is started by the peer acting as group setup initiator.
• Forward Request: the group setup request is forwarded to another peer in a random walk-
like manner. An unvisited neighbor of the current peer is selected as next peer. However,
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if no such neighbor exists, the group setup backtracks to the previous peer. If the group
setup has already backtracked to the group setup initiator, it continues to the finish setup
phase if the number of peers that have been recruited as participants equals or exceeds the
group size minimum and otherwise to the cancel setup phase.
• Handle Request: The group setup arrives at a new peer. If this peer is visited for the first
time, it checks whether to take part in the group and does so if it has enough capacities left.
Then, the group setup either continues to the finish setup or the forward request phase,
depending on whether the group size target has been reached.
• Finish Setup: The group setup initiator notifies all peers that agreed to participate in the
group. Those peers are now participants of the new group and know each other participant
of the group.
• Cancel Setup: The group setup initiator notifies all peers that agreed to participate in the
group of its setup being canceled.
While not explicitly mentioned, each peer that decides to participate in a group setup reserves
capacity for the case that it succeeds and results in a new ADC-nets. This reserved capacity is
freed when the group setup is canceled. Hereby, it is ensured that the capacity is never exceeded.
Example 4.5.1: Group Setup
Assume a network with the peers P = {A,B,C ,D}. Assume A to be directly connected to
B,C and D. Assume B,C and D not to be directly connected to each other. Assume that
each peer has enough capacities to take part in a new ADC-net.
Scenario: B initiates a group setup with a group size minimum of 3 and a group size
target of 5. Assume that the handle request phase initiates a new round. Further assume
round 0 as initialization phase. We present the state of the group setup after each round:
Round peer v isi ted par t icipants path unvisited neighbors of peer
0 B [B] [B] [B] A
1 A [B,A] [B,A] [B,A] C ,D
2 D [B,A,D] [B,A,D] [B,A,D]
3 A [B,A,D] [B,A,D] [B,A] C
4 C [B,A,D,C] [B,A,D,C] [B,A,C]
5 A [B,A,D,C] [B,A,D,C] [B,A]
6 B [B,A,D,C] [B,A,D,C] [B]
The group setup is finished because
1. all neighbors of B have already been visited and because
2. the group setup cannot backtrack further after reaching its initiator.
While the group size target of 5 has not been reached, the group setup still succeeds as
the group size minimum of 3 is not undercut.
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While our approach is easy to implement, it is problematic under the assumption of sabotaging
insider adversaries. We encounter several problems that are similar to those presented in Section
2.6.3. Adversarial peers can
• impersonate other peers if they control all the communication links over which the random
walk can reach these peers and
• fake larger anonymity sets by pretending to be connected to peers that do not actually exist.
The impersonation challenge can be addressed by using unforgeable and verifiable signatures
for all communication messages. This way, each peer can check for every message whether it
was actually sent by the apparent sender and discard it if it was not.
Preventing adversaries from faking larger anonymity sets is more problematic, especially in
P2P networks where it can be assumed that each peer only knows a subset of the other peers.
Hereby, honest peers cannot distinguish between real and faked peers. This problem is compa-
rable to the sensor detection challenge in P2P botnets. Existing botnets address this challenge
by limiting the number of botnet peers per subnet to prevent a high population of sensors
[3]. While we do not evaluate this approach, it may be a suitable technique for preventing
adversaries from faking a large number of peers.
While the adversary model introduced in Section 2.3 assumes that adversaries do not inten-
tionally disrupt the communication, we still discuss this problem in the context of group setups:
Adversaries can easily disrupt group setups by refusing to forward random walks to other peers.
To increase the probability of at least one random walk not being disrupted by an adversary, we
propose the execution of multiple random walks in parallel. This may also reduce the power
of individual adversaries that try to fake participants to control a large portion of the resulting
group. They have to “take over” multiple group setups that are executed in a random walk-like
manner to prevent other peers from increasing the effective anonymity set size of the resulting
group. However, the simultaneous execution of multiple random walks requires a modified ver-
sion of Algorithm 3. We rely on a slightly modified version of the original algorithm with an
additional timeout parameter. This parameter is used for stopping each random walk after a
specific number of hops. Hereby, it can prevent
• the recruitment of too many participants and
• the traversal of all peers when only very few have capacities left.
Thus, each random walk can be executed independently from the other random walks without
coordination by the group initiator. We evaluate the performance of using multiple random
walks and timeouts on the basis of this approach in Section 6.3. It can certainly be refined, for
instance, by using periodic coordination of the random walks to reduce the number of peers
that are visited/recruited by multiple random walks. We leave such thinkable enhancements to
future work.
4.5.3 Overlay Interaction
We now address the overlay interaction observation challenge introduced in Section 4.2. We
propose that ADC-net participants conduct all sender-related overlay interactions through the
ADC-net by using the RP as proxy. Hence, adversaries can only observe sender-related over-
lay interactions of RPs but cannot identify the ADC-net participants behind these interactions.
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Sender-unrelated interactions, for instance, joining an overlay to receive messages on it, can
still be executed directly by peers. This solves the overlay interaction observation challenge.
Our specific approach relies on interest control messages that contain one topic of interest and
can be used by ADC-net participants to anonymously notify the RP of their interests. These
messages are published in ADC-nets as secret messages. When a RP receives an interest control
message, it tries to join an existing overlay that addresses the topic of interest. If no such overlay
exists, the RP initiates a new overlay for this topic, e.g., by using one of the techniques presented
in Section 3.3.
Using this approach, ADC-net participants can send their interests to the RP without being
linked to them. This is crucial for sender protection as adversaries may use such information
for identifying the sender of a message. Furthermore, interests should only be sent one-by-one
to prevent adversarial RPs from linking ADC-net participants to their interests by comparing
interest sets across ADC-nets.
Example 4.5.2: Dangers of Information Leakage
Given a set of peers P = {1,2,3,4}. Assume that Ii represents the interest set of peer
i ∈ P. Assume that I1 = I2 = I4 = {} and I3 = {priv ac y,networking}. Assume
that Ax ,k = { j, k, l} denotes the ADC-net with the identifier x , the RP k ∈ P and the
participants j, k, l ∈ P.
Scenario 1: Assume that the participants of Aa,1 = {1,2,3,4} publish their interests.
Assume that they send the interests in plain text to the RP instead of using the presented
technique:
• 3 sends each interest in I3 to the RP of Aa,1.
• A global eavesdropping adversary can identify the contents and the sender of these
messages and hereby links I3 to 3.
• 3 sends a privacy-related secret message over Aa,1 and the RP forwards it to its re-
cipients on a privacy-related overlay.
• The global eavesdropping adversary can link this message to 3 as it is the only par-
ticipant of Aa,1 that is interested in the privacy topic.
Scenario 2: Assume that 2 is an adversarial peer. Assume that the participants of Ab,2 ={1,2,3} and Ac,2 = {2,3,4} want to publish their interests not one-by-one but instead all
interests at once:
1. 3 publishes I3 in both Ab,2 and Ac,2.
2. As RP of both Ab,2 and Ac,2, 2 can detect that I3 was published in both ADC-nets. As,
apart from the adversary, 3 is the only peer that participates in both ADC-nets, 2 can
link I3 to 3 with high certainty.
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4.5.4 Example
We present an example of our model in which we describe one of multiple scenarios that results
in the network structure presented in Figure 4.2:
1. Peer 3 initializes the creation of the ADC-net after its initialization check, as presented in
Section 4.5.1, succeeds.
2. Peer 3 starts the group setup as presented in Section 4.5.2. The outcome of this group
setup is the set G = {1,2,3, 4,6} containing the group participants.
3. The RP election is conducted as presented in Section 4.4.1 and with G as initial candidate
set. Peer 4 is elected as RP.
4. The ADC-net participants generate master secrets as presented in Section 2.6.1.
5. The ADC-net participants can now induce the creation of the overlay by sending their
interests to the RP as presented in Section 4.5.3. For simplicity, we assume that all peers
in G are interested in the same topic and that the created overlay is related to this topic.
6. We assume that the remaining participants of the overlay joined it after its initialization by
the RP.
7. Now, each participant of the ADC-net can use it to send messages to every participant of
the overlay by using the RP as proxy as presented in Section 4.4.2.
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5 Implementation
5.1 Introduction
We developed a prototypical framework for demonstrating and evaluating our theoretical ap-
proach. We chose Python as programming language for the implementation and elaborate on
this selection in Section 5.2.
Our framework comprises two main packages and several scripts:
• The adc_net package contains the main logic for running simulations and hence can be
seen as the main application. The different components of this package are presented in
Section 5.3.
• The main application is supplemented by several scripts that can be used for different
purposes, including the deployment of the framework, the execution of simulations with
configuration presets and the interaction with running simulations. The different scripts
are presented in Section 5.4.
• The adc_net_eval package contains the logic for evaluating simulation runs and is pre-
sented in Section 5.5.
Throughout this chapter, we present a number of modules and scripts that can be configured
via command-line interfaces (CLIs). Detailed information regarding the specific arguments and
flags can be accessed by calling the respective script with the --help flag. Therefore, we mainly
present the functionality and only sometimes refer to the specific arguments and flags. Further-
more, we only present the most relevant options.
5.2 Python
Python is an interpreted high-level programming language that is especially popular in the sci-
entific domain. We present a number of reasons for Pythons popularity and also discuss the rel-
evance of certain aspects for our implementation in Section 5.2.1. As can be expected, Python
also has certain limitations when compared to other programming languages. In Section 5.2.2,
we discuss one specific problem that has an impact on our implementation. Last, we list the
Python community packages our framework depends on in Section 5.2.3.
Design 5.2.1: Python Version
As of writing, Python 3.5 is the latest version for which official Raspbian Stretch Python
packages are available. Therefore, we use this Python version to allow the execution of
distributed simulations using multiple Raspberry Pis.
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5.2.1 Positive Aspects
When compared to other high-level programming languages like C or Java, the simplicity and
readability of Pythons syntax stands out. Still, it is a very powerful language with a reasonable
abstraction level. Due to its popularity, it is widely supported by different operating systems.
Combined with Python being an interpreted language, this allows for the easy deployment of
our framework. Furthermore, Pythons large standard library allowed us to develop a complex
framework within a reasonable timespan. It is supplemented by a multitude of community-
maintained packages that can easily be installed in a Python virtual environment. We depend
on several community packages and list them in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.2 Negative Aspects
CPython is the reference implementation of the Python interpreter and hence widely used. It
uses a global interpreter lock (GIL) [2] which is a mutex that ensures that only one thread
within a process can execute code at a time. While this ensures the thread-safety of certain
Python operations, it prevents the effective use of multithreading. With our framework being
designed for running local simulations with more than 1,000 peers of which each one runs
multiple threads, the GIL becomes a critical problem. It is unfeasible to run simulations with
this number of peers on only one CPU core.
Due to multithreading not being a viable alternative, we resort to multiprocessing where each
peer has its own process. While running multiple Python threads is relatively lightweight due to
many resources being shared among different threads, Python processes cause a higher memory
usage due to the strict isolation of resources. We observed the impact of using multiprocessing
instead of multithreading on the memory usage of our simulations and present our results in
Table 5.1. The different peers were only initialized and no actual simulation logic was executed.
We conducted three tests per setting that yielded very similar results and used the median
value for the computation of the approximate memory usage per peer. It can be seen that the
memory usage increases significantly when using multiprocessing. However, we put up with the
increased resource requirements as it allows us to fully utilize modern multi-core systems and
conduct real-time simulations with a considerable number of peers.
Table 5.1.: Comparison of the memory usage of initialized adc_net simulations for multithread-
ing and multiprocessing. All of these simulations were conducted on the same ma-
chine running Arch Linux (AMD64).
Peers Total Memory Usage Approximate Memory Usage per Peer
M.Threading M.Processing M.Threading M.Processing
100 0.05G 0.61G 0.50M 6.10M
500 0.13G 3.14G 0.26M 6.28M
1000 0.25G 6.38G 0.25M 6.38M
2000 0.48G 13.43G 0.24M 6.72M
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5.2.3 Community Packages
Our implementation depends on the following community packages:
• cryptography: cryptographic library package. Used for key exchanges and key derivation
in the adc_net/util/crypto wrapper module presented in Section 5.3.4.
• networkx: network generation and interaction package. Used for the generation of net-
work definitions in the network_generation script presented in Section 5.4.2.
• paramiko: SSH connection package. Used for remote deployment in the remote_deploy
script presented in Section 5.4.1.
• numpy: array-processing package. Used for the evaluation in the adc_net_eval package
presented in Section 5.5.
• scipy: scientific library package. Used for the evaluation in the adc_net_eval package
presented in Section 5.5.
• plotly: plotting package. Used for the generation of evaluation plots in the adc_net_eval
package presented in Section 5.5.
5.3 Main Application: adc_net Package
The adc_net package contains the functionality for running simulations and hence can be seen
as our main application. We designed it with two main modes:
• simulation: All peers are simulated on one host using loopback addresses.
• prototype: Peers are simulated on multiple hosts in a local network.
Both modes rely on the same code base and only differ in the way that simulation peers are set
up. To prevent confusion, we refer to simulations run in the simulation mode as local and to
simulations run in the prototype mode as distributed.
The structure of this section is as follows: First, in Section 5.3.1, we present the __main__
module which functions as entry module for the adc_net package. In Section 5.3.2, we present
the conf module which can be used for the configuration of simulations. In Section 5.3.3,
we present the comm module which is used for low-level communication between peers. In
Section 5.3.4, we present the crypto and the logging modules which function as wrapper
modules for the cryptography community package and the official Python logging package.
In Section 5.3.5, we present the messaging module which is used for building and parsing
standardized program messages. In Section 5.3.6, we present the peer module that combines
the functionality of the other modules in the Peer class which is used for simulating a peer.
In Section 5.3.7, we present the handler package which is used for executing group setups, RP
elections and for running ADC-nets. Final, in Section 5.3.8, we present the evaluation package
which is used for logging evaluation information that can then be analyzed by the adc_net_eval
package presented in Section 5.5.
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5.3.1 Program Entry: __main__.py
The __main__ module can be used for starting adc_net simulations. As such, it is responsible
for
• loading the configuration from the file system using the conf module presented in Section
5.3.2,
• setting up debug logging using the logging module presented in Section 5.3.4,
• setting up evaluation logging using the evaluation package presented in Section 5.3.8 and
• initializing one or multiple simulation peer(s) depending on the used main mode. Peers
are initialized by instantiating the Peer class presented in Section 5.3.6.
5.3.2 Configuration: conf.py
The conf module is used for reading configurations from the file system and for parsing them.
We use the JSON format for configurations as it can easily be imported as python dictionary.
We use the following types of configurations:
• Main: allows the configuration of most program settings.
• Prototype: allows the configuration of a single simulated peer.
• Simulation: allows the configuration of multiple simulated peers.
All the settings are listed and explained in the README of the project. Therefore, we only list the
most relevant settings of the main configuration in the Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. The prototype
and simulation configurations mainly differ in the number of peers being configured. While the
prototype configuration only contains one peer, the simulation configuration contains a list of
peers. The peer configuration options are the same for both configuration types and listed in
Table A.4.
For each type of configuration, a default configuration exists. They contain settings that
proved to be reasonable defaults. Each default configuration can be overwritten by using a local
configurations.
Configurations can also be supplied as function parameters to the main function of the
__main__ module presented in Section 5.3.1. This allows an easy integration with the
batch_execution script presented in Section 5.4.4 as modified configurations can directly
be used for executing adc_net simulations without the need for intermediate file system in-
teractions.
5.3.3 Network Communication: comm.py
The comm module is used for low-level network communication between peers. We use UDP as
communication protocol as it is connectionless and hence easy to use in a P2P setting.
We use two designated threads:
1. Sender Thread: Continuously fetches messages from the send queue, serializes and sends
them from the address of the current peer.
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2. Receiver Thread: Listens on the address of the current peer on the configured port, deseri-
alizes received messages and puts them into the receive queue.
This approach allows us to execute blocking network operations without blocking the peer logic.
While we keep our implementation simple, we propose the following thinkable improvements
for real-world applications:
• Multicast: We only implement unicast communication. Multicast could be used for improv-
ing the performance of group communication operations. For instance, the distribution of
RP election votes could be realized more efficiently using multicast.
• Signatures: As mentioned in Section 2.11, unforgeable and verifiable signatures could be
used for preventing adversaries from impersonating other peers. This requires a public
key infrastructure (PKI) which can be entrusted with the distribution of the public keys of
each peer to allow the verification of signatures. Assuming the existence of such a PKI,
the signing and verification of messages could be implemented on a low level in the comm
module as follows:
– Each outgoing messages is signed with the private key of the sending peer.
– The signature of each incoming message is verified using the public keys distributed
by the PKI. If the verification fails, the message is discarded.
5.3.4 Utilities: util Package
The util package contains wrapper modules that encapsulate functionality from the Python
standard library and community packages.
Cryptography Wrapper: crypto.py
The crypto module provides functions for cryptographic operations used throughout the
adc_net module. As cryptography is complex, we rely on the cryptography community package
for the implementations of low-level cryptographic operations.
Design 5.3.1: Elliptic-curve Cryptography
Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) can be used for achieving a comparable level of security
with significantly smaller key sizes than classical asymmetric cryptography schemes like
RSA [33]. Therefore, we use ECC for cryptographic operations.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, we wanted to allow the execution of distributed simulations
using multiple Raspberry Pis. To allow the efficient execution of cryptographic operations
on Raspberry Pis (Model 3B), we conducted a number of tests using the OpenSSL speed
command [1] and selected SECP256R1 as elliptic curve. Our tests indicate that this curve
is a good trade-off between security and performance for our specific use case.
The crypto module provides the following cryptographic functionality:
• the generation of asymmetric key pairs using ECC.
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• the generation of shared master secrets for the ADC-net communication using pair-wise
elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchanges. Both peers use their private key and
the public key of the other peer for the ECDH key exchange.
• the derivation of round secrets using HKDF [31] as key derivation function (KDF). Round
secrets for a specific master secret and a specific round are derived by using the master
secret as input key material and the round number as salt.
While we keep our implementation simple, we propose the following thinkable improvements
for real-world applications:
• Authenticated ECDH should be used to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This
can be achieved by using verifiable and unforgeable signatures for all communication mes-
sages as proposed in Section 5.3.3.
• As proposed in Section 2.6.3, new master secrets could be periodically generated to im-
prove the security of the ADC-net communication.
Logging Wrapper: logging.py
The logging module functions as wrapper for the Python logging module and is used for debug
logging. Whether debug logging is enabled and whether log messages are written to a log file or
the standard output stdout can be configured in the adc_net main configuration. Since debug
logging is not relevant for the actual functionality, we do not explain this module in detail.
5.3.5 Messaging: messaging Package
The messaging package is used for building and parsing standardized program messages that
are used for the communication between different peers. We use python dictionaries for all
program messages as they allow us to use multiple key-value entries.
Each program message contains a type key whose value is an element of the MsgType enumer-
ation which contains all program message types. Therefore, each peer that receives a message
can determine the type of this message and handle it accordingly as presented in Section 5.3.6.
The other entries of program message dictionaries vary for the different message types. For
instance, each group setup program message contains the group_uid entry which is used for
distinguishing between different group setups, RP elections and ADC-nets as presented in Sec-
tion 5.3.7.
5.3.6 Peer Logic: peer.py
The peer module contains the Peer class. This class is used for simulating a peer and hereby
combines the logic from the other adc_net modules. As part of the initialization of a Peer
instance, the following tasks are executed:
1. The interest set and the neighbor list of the peer are stored.
2. The communication component of the peer is initialized. The functionality of this compo-
nent is presented in Section 5.3.3.
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3. The approach logic handlers presented in Section 5.3.7 are initialized. They are used for
the logic behind group setups, RP elections and ADC-net functionality.
4. The following threads are initialized:
• Message Handler Thread: processes received program messages.
• Periodic Handler Thread: executes certain tasks periodically.
We use these two different threads as their tasks contain blocking operations, hence ren-
dering a sequential implementation impractical. Both threads continuously execute their
tasks until the peer receives a shutdown program message and shuts down. Shutdown
messages are explained in the next section.
Message Handler Logic
The message handler continuously fetches received program messages from the receive queue
presented in Section 5.3.3 and processes each of them as follows:
1. The type of the program message is parsed using the messaging package presented in
Section 5.3.5.
2. The other entries of the program message are parsed in dependency to its type using the
messaging package.
3. The handler function designated for this program message type is called with the parsed
information.
Most of the handler functions are part of one of the handler modules presented in Section 5.3.7.
However, two special types of program messages are directly handled in the message handler of
the peer:
• Startup: When a peer first receives a startup program message, it forwards this message to
all its neighbors and then starts with the periodic execution of tasks. Subsequent startup
program messages are ignored.
• Shutdown: When a peer receives a shutdown program message, it forwards this message
to all its neighbors and then shuts down by terminating its handler threads.
Design 5.3.2: Startup & Shutdown Program Messages
We use program messages for starting and stopping simulations. Using the presented
approach, we can easily start/stop both local and distributed simulations by sending
a single startup/shutdown program message to one of the simulation peers. For this
purpose, we created the startup and shutdown scripts that are presented in Section 5.4.5.
Before using this approach, we encountered the Startup Phase Message Loss challenge. We
observed that it can lead to message loss if peers start group setups and forward them
to neighbor peers that are not yet set up. Our approach solves this challenge as we can
observe the initialization status of the simulation peers and start the simulation as soon
as all peers are set up. As shown in Section 5.4.4, this can also partly be automatized.
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Periodic Handler Logic
The periodic handler periodically executes tasks. We essentially have two types of tasks:
• The (ADC-net) group setup initialization check presented in Section 5.3.7.
• Periodic ADC-net tasks that are executed for all ADC-nets in which the peer participates,
for instance, the periodic sending of ADC-net messages.
As presented in the last section, the periodic handler only starts with the periodic execution of
tasks after its peer has received a startup message. This addresses the startup phase message
loss challenge.
5.3.7 Approach Logic: handler Package
The main logic of our theoretical approach, which is presented in Chapter 4, is implemented in
the handler package. We implemented group setups, RP elections and ADC-net functionality in
different modules and present them in the following sections.
Group Setup: group.py
The group handler module contains the logic for executing distributed group setups as presented
by Algorithm 3. The communication for these setups is realized using a number of group setup
program messages. We do not explain the different group setup program messages and their
handling in detail as the logic is very similar to the group setup approach presented in Section
4.5.2.
It is desirable that multiple group setups can be executed in parallel in the same network
without this potentially leading to identification problems. This requires a unique group iden-
tifier that can be used for linking each group setup program message to its respective group
setup.
Design 5.3.3: group_uids
We use a tuple containing
1. the address of the peer that initiated the group and
2. a timestamp of the time at which the group was initiated
as (sufficiently) unique identifier of a group and refer to it as group_uid. We not only
use it for distinguishing between multiple group setups but also for uniquely identifying
RP elections and ADC-nets as they are all executed in a specific group. This allows
the parallel execution of multiple group setups, RP elections and ADC-nets in the same
network.
We decided to use Unix epoch timestamps as they can be easily queried using the Python
time package. However, we observed problems with using the standard time resolution
of seconds since the Unix epoch. In very few cases, multiple groups were initiated by
the same peer within a very short timespan, resulting in the same group_uid being used
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for these groups. Therefore, we use the number of milliseconds since the Unix epoch as
timestamps to reduce the probability of duplicate group_uids. We did not observe any
duplicate group_uids for the increased time resolution.
The module also includes the logic for periodically checking whether a new ADC-net should
be initialized as such an initialization starts a new group setup. This check is implemented like
the initialization check presented by Algorithm 2. It is periodically executed by the periodic
handler of the peer as presented in Section 5.3.6.
RP Election: election.py
The election handler module contains the logic for executing distributed RP elections compa-
rable to the non-distributed version presented by Algorithm 1. We refer to Section 4.4.1 for a
detailed description of the used approach.
ADC-net Functionality: adc.py
The adc handler module contains the logic for
1. finalizing the initialization of ADC-nets by generating master secrets and
2. ADC-net runtime functionality.
For each ADC-net, master secrets are generated using ECC as presented in Section 5.3.4. We
refrain from a detailed description of the master secret generation as it can be exchanged with
any other technique that establishes master secrets as presented in 2.6.1.
We refrain from describing each implementation aspect of the ADC-net functionality that is
presented in detail in Section 4.4. Instead, we present and explain a number of design decision
we made during the implementation:
• The theoretical approach presented in Section 4.4 does not specify when the decryption of
ADC-net messages is conducted by RPs.
Design 5.3.4: ADC-net Message Decryption
In our initial implementation of the ADC-net message decryption, a RP waited until
it had received all ADC-net messages of a round and then decrypted the published
secret message by XORing all ADC-net messages of this round. Especially for larger
groups, this is problematic as a lot of ADC-net messages have to be stored by the RP
before the published message can be extracted by XORing all the ADC-net messages.
We address this challenge by using on-the-fly decryption. Here, the RP directly XORs
the ADC-net messages of a round upon their arrival and only stores the result of
the consecutive XOR operations instead of each ADC-net message. Furthermore, for
each round, the RP keeps track of the ADC-net participants from which an ADC-net
message has been received. Thereby, it can detect whether all messages have been
received and also prevent disruption by participants that send multiple ADC-net
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messages for the same round.
On-the-fly decryption reduces the memory requirements for each RP: Only one mes-
sage and tracking information have to be stored for each round for which not all
ADC-net messages have yet been received. Keeping track of the ADC-net partici-
pants whose ADC-net message has been received can be done efficiently, for instance
using an array structure in which one bit is used for representing the state of each
participant.
• In Section 2.6.4, we presented the challenge of colliding non-empty secret messages. In
Section 4.4.2, we presented an optional modification of the ADC-net communication model
for allowing collision detection. Hence, approaches for collision detection and handling
that can be applied to DC-nets can also be applied to ADC-nets.
Design 5.3.5: Collision Handling
We implemented collision handling as optional functionality which can be en-
/disabled using the adc.collision_handling.enabled configuration option listed
in Table A.3. We use the following technique which is comparable to slotted ALOHA
[42]:
– If a peer detects that a non-empty secret message that it previously tried to
publish in an ADC-net was part of a collision, it initiates a wait period within
this ADC-net.
– During this wait period, the peer only sends empty secret messages in the
ADC-net to prevent further collisions.
– The duration of the wait period is randomized and depends on the
adc.collision_handling.wait_prob configuration option listed in Table A.3.
During the wait period, a probability check is conducted each ADC-net round
to determine whether the wait period continues.
– As soon as the wait period ends, the peer retransmits the non-empty secret
message whose collision resulted in the wait period.
• We wanted to be able to simulate the sender behavior of peers to allow more realistic
simulations and a more detailed evaluation.
Design 5.3.6: Sender Control and Message Tracking
We decided to use program messages for controlling the send behavior of peers. For
this purpose, we created the sender_control script which is presented in Section
5.4.5.
When a peer receives a sender control message, it adopts the send configuration
defined by this message for a random ADC-net it takes part in. We do not explain
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the periodic generation of messages for sender configurations in detail and instead
refer to the sender_control script configuration options listed in Table A.6.
In addition to regular message sending, we also implemented message tracking. If
message tracking is enabled, the following information is added to each message
that is generated by sender configurations:
– Sender: the sender of the message.
– Round: the number of the ADC-net round in which the message was generated
and added to the send queue.
This option is clearly leaking sensitive information regarding the sender and as such
should never be used for a real-world applications. However, it allows us to evaluate
certain aspects, for instance, the delay between a message being generated and it be-
ing successfully published in the respective ADC-net. We use this option for tracking
the mean delay of messages for the evaluation presented in Section 6.5.
• In Section 4.4.3, we presented transient behavior as option for reducing the overhead
induced by ADC-nets by disbanding ADC-nets that are not sufficiently utilized.
Design 5.3.7: Transiency
We implemented transient behavior as optional functionality which can be en-
/disabled using the the adc.transiency.enabled configuration option listed in
Table A.3. This table also contains a number of options for configuring the dif-
ferent aspects of transiency which are presented in Section 4.4.3.
• In Section 4.5, we presented how ADC-net participants can use the RP as proxy for overlay
interactions.
Design 5.3.8: Overlay Interactions
For simplicity, we did not implement the overlay interactions executed by RPs. In-
stead, RPs log the secret messages that are published in their ADC-net. These secret
messages also include interest control messages that are presented in Section 4.5.3.
5.3.8 Evaluation: evaluation Package
The evaluation package contains functionality for logging information that is relevant for eval-
uation purposes. This is conducted as follows:
• We use evaluation messages for logging. Their format is comparable to the one used for
program messages.
• Each peer logs its evaluation messages to a CSV log file designated for this peer. Hereby,
the same evaluation logging logic can be used for local and distributed simulations.
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• A peer logs an evaluation message when an evaluation-relevant event occurs. We do not
discuss these events as this goes beyond the scope of a short summary of the evaluation
package.
• Each peer also creates a JSON metadata file containing the configuration options used for
the simulation.
As presented in Section 5.5, this information can be used for reconstructing and evaluating
group setups, RP elections and ADC-nets.
5.4 Scripts
We created a number of scripts for different tasks and present them in this section.
5.4.1 Deployment: deploy.py, remote_deploy.py
We wrote two scripts to allow the easy deployment of our framework:
• The deploy script can be used for
– cloning the repository from a central Git repository,
– pulling the latest version of the program code from this repository,
– setting up a local Python virtual environment and
– installing the required community packages in this virtual environment.
• The remote_deploy script can be used for
– copying files required for the deployment to a remote host via SFTP and
– executing the deploy script on a remote host via SSH.
The deploy script relies on a private SSH key which only allows read access to the central Git
repository and is stored in the repository itself. This way, the deploy script can execute Git
operations using SSH without the need for additional SSH configuration on the host. While it
is never a good idea to publish private keys in repositories, it is acceptable for this use case as
only read access is granted.
The remote_deploy script uses SSH for connecting to remote hosts. It was primarily designed
for the deployment to Raspberry Pis located in a local network and therefore uses the Raspberry
Pi default credentials for the SSH login.
5.4.2 Network Generation: network_generation.py
The network_generation script can be used for generating network definitions with config-
urable properties. It can be configured via a CLI using the options presented in Table A.5. As the
options are explained in this table, we refrain from presenting them here. However, to prevent
confusion, we introduce the term node which we use when referring to peers whose network
properties are defined but that are not instantiated in a simulation.
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5.4.3 Group Setup Simulation: group_setup_simulation.py
The group_setup_simulation script can be used for simulating group setups with extended
functionality without having to integrate the extensions into the group setup logic of our
adc_net application. We created this script for conducting the evaluation presented in Sec-
tion 6.3. For simplicity, we implemented a non-distributed version of the group setup algorithm
presented in Section 4.5.2 which can be configured using the following group setup configura-
tion options:
• Number of Walks: the number of random walks that are executed in parallel.
• Group Size Target: the desired number of group participants.
• Participation Probability: the probability of a peer being recruited as participant when it is
first visited by a random walk. This option functions as simple replacement of the capacity
configuration and can be used for simulating the percentage of peers in a network that
have reached their capacity.
• Timeout: the number of hops at which a random walk is finished regardless of the number
of recruited participants.
A CLI can be used for supplying the group setups configuration options as arguments. Addi-
tionally, the following aspects can be configured via the CLI:
• the properties of the network used for the group setup simulations. The network is gener-
ated using the network generation script presented in Section 5.4.2.
• the number of simulations that are executed for the specified options.
• whether the exhaustive simulation mode is enabled. It is used for the group setup evalua-
tion presented in Section 6.3.
We designed the evaluation mode for executing a considerable number of simulations for each
combination of the group setup configuration options. Thereby, we use multiprocessing for
the parallel execution of multiple simulations to fully utilize multi-core systems and reduce
execution time.
5.4.4 Controlled ADC-net Execution: batch_execution, batch_evaluation
The batch_execution script can be used for executing adc_net simulations for a number of
hard-coded configuration presets. It therefore functions as wrapper for the adc_net/__main__
module presented in Section 5.3.1. A number of configuration presets for the following config-
uration types exist:
• RunMode: defines whether local or distributed simulations are executed.
• MainConfMode: defines a number of modifications to the default adc_net main configura-
tion.
• NetworkConfMode: defines the properties of the network used for the simulations. The
definition of the simulation network is generated using the network_generation script
presented in Section 5.4.2.
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• ControlMode: defines interactions with a running simulation.
In addition to hard-coded configuration presets,
• the number of simulations executed consecutively and
• the duration of each simulation in seconds
can be set. The modes and configuration options can be configured via a CLI.
Design 5.4.1: Sender Control Modes
Control modes can be used for interacting with running simulations. While they can be
used for all kinds of interactions, we only use them for controlling the send behavior of
peers: We use Sender Control Modes defined by a tuple of the form (sender rate, send
probability) with
1. the sender rate as percentage of peers that are potential senders and
2. the send probability as probability with which a potential sender sends a non-empty
secret message in an ADC-net round.
Sender control modes are realized by sending sender control program messages to a
number of randomly selected peers after starting the simulation via a startup message.
The number of peers depends on the sender rate and the configuration of the sender
control program messages depends on the send probability.
We use sender control modes for the evaluation of our ADC-net collision handling and
ADC-net transiency implementations in the Sections 6.5 and 6.6.
Design 5.4.2: Simulation Startup and Duration
As presented in Section 5.3.7, simulations should only be started when all simulation
peers are set up. Therefore, we use the following techniques for ensuring that all peers
are set up:
• Local Simulations: We use multiprocessing barriers that are passed when all simula-
tion peers are set up.
• Distributed Simulations: We use a startup wait time parameter that has to be set
manually and defines the time after which each distributed peer has to be set up.
When all peers are set up, the simulation is started using startup program messages as
presented in Section 5.3.6. Also, a threaded timer is initialized which initiates the sending
of shutdown program messages after the specified simulation duration.
The batch_evaluation script functions as wrapper for executing adc_net simulations for the
evaluation for a number of configuration combinations. Its CLI can be used for selecting
• which type of evaluation simulation is run and
• how many simulations are run for each configuration combination.
We used this script for running the simulations for the evaluation tasks presented in the Sections
6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
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5.4.5 Simulation Interaction
We created a number of scripts for interacting with running simulations and present them in
this section.
Simulation Startup: startup.py
The startup script can be used for sending a startup program message to a peer. This peer can
be specified via a CLI by supplying an address and a port. Startup messages are presented in
Section 5.3.6.
Sender Control: sender_control.py
The sender_control script can be used for sending sender control program messages to a peer
to control its sender behavior. The different options that can be supplied to the script via a
CLI are listed in Table A.6. When the script is executed, a sender control program message
containing the specified configuration settings, except the addressing information, is sent to the
addressed peer. How sender control program messages are handled by peers is described in
Section 5.3.7.
Simulation Shutdown: shutdown.py
The shutdown script can be used for sending a shutdown program message to a peer. This peer
can be specified via a CLI by supplying an address and a port. Shutdown messages are presented
in Section 5.3.6.
5.5 Evaluation Application: adc_net_eval Package
The adc_net_eval package can be used for evaluating group setups, RP elections and ADC-nets
simulated with the adc_net package presented in Section 5.3. We only present the general
evaluation procedure and refrain from explaining the specific tasks and the CLI options as this
goes beyond the scope of a short summary of the adc_net_eval package:
1. The adc_net evaluation logs for either a specified or all simulation runs are read in from
the file system, parsed and used for reconstructing the group setups, RP elections and
ADC-nets on-the-fly.
2. The reconstruction of the group setups, RP elections and ADC-nets is finalized.
3. The reconstructed information is used for evaluating a number of aspects.
4. (optional) Evaluation plots are created and exported to the file system.
5. (optional) The evaluation results are exported as JSON to the file system.
We use multiprocessing for the parallel evaluation of multiple simulation runs to fully utilize
multi-core systems and reduce execution time.
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6 Evaluation
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we evaluate our theoretical approach and our implementation of this approach.
Furthermore, we discuss the results of this evaluation. The structure of this chapter is as follows:
First, we compare DC-nets to ADC-nets with regards to their anonymity set size and overhead in
Section 6.2. Then in Section 6.3, we analyze the impact of different group setup configuration
parameters on a number of group setup properties using the group_setup_simulation script
presented in Section 5.4.3. In Section 6.4, we evaluate the speed of our RP elections and the
distribution of elected RPs in the underlay using our adc_net implementation. We also use
it for analyzing the performance of our ADC-net collision handling technique in Section 6.5
and for evaluating the impact of different transition threshold settings on transient ADC-nets in
Section 6.6. We conclude the evaluation by addressing a number of relevant research questions
in Section 6.7.
For the evaluations in the Sections 6.3 to 6.6, we ran a number of simulations with different
goals and experimental setups. Therefore, we structure these sections as follows:
1. Approach: We present our approach and introduce the goals of the evaluation.
2. Experimental Setup: We describe the experimental setup used for the simulations.
3. Results: We present and discuss the evaluation results.
6.2 Comparison of DC-nets and ADC-nets
We presented classical DC-nets in Section 2.6 and introduced ADC-nets in Section 4.4. In Section
6.2.1, we compare them with regards to their anonymity set size. Then, in Section 6.2.2, we
compare their communication and computation overhead.
6.2.1 Anonymity Set Size
We introduced anonymity sets in Section 2.2 and mentioned that their size can be used as
anonymity metric. We also presented how colluding adversaries may reduce the effective
anonymity set size of DC-nets/ADC-nets. Therefore, larger anonymity sets do not necessar-
ily exhibit a better privacy protection than smaller anonymity sets. However, we assume that
Table 6.1.: The anonymity set size for send operations for different communication models in a
network with P as set of peers and PADC as set of ADC-net participants.
Communication Model Anonymity Set Size
DC-nets |P|
ADC-nets |PADC |, PADC ⊆ P
57
Table 6.2.: Communication (m) and computation (o) overhead per round of communication for
different communication models. Assume p as number of DC-net/ADC-net partici-
pants and r as mean number of recipients per round to which a RP has to forward a
published message.
Communication Model m o
DC-nets p · (p− 1) p · (p− 1) + p · (p− 1)
ADC-nets (p− 1) + r
p · (p− 1) + p− 1
ADC-nets with collision detection 2 · (p− 1) + r
larger anonymity sets always exhibit a better privacy protection to simplify the following com-
parison, which is visualized in Table 6.1:
• Classical DC-nets comprise all peers. Hence, they always exhibit the maximum anonymity
set size that can be achieved in the underlying network.
• ADC-nets comprise a configurable number of peers when used as presented in Section
4.5. Hence, the anonymity set size can be individually selected for specific use cases. For
instance, communication with critical content can be protected by using larger anonymity
sets at the cost of increased overhead.
Yet, it has to be noted that the anonymity set size of ADC-nets only applies for send operations.
Due to our overhead reduction optimizations, receiver anonymity is not preserved anymore.
However, this is not problematic for our approach as we only focus on sender protection.
6.2.2 Overhead
As mentioned in Section 2.6.4, the overhead induced by DC-net CT is a major challenge with
regards to the realizability of DC-nets. We introduced ADC-nets in Section 4.4 to address this
challenge. However, in Section 4.4.2, we also mentioned that the communication model of
ADC-nets prevents collision detection. To address this challenge, we proposed a slightly modi-
fied version of the ADC-net communication model that can be used when collision detection is
required.
We now compare the communication and computation overhead of classical DC-nets,
ADC-nets and ADC-nets with collision detection. For both comparisons, we assume p ≥ 2 as
number of DC-net/ADC-net participants. Furthermore, for ADC-nets, we assume r as mean
number of recipients per round to which a RP has to forward a published message.
Communication Overhead
Assume m as number of messages which are sent over the network for each round of communi-
cation. We now compare m for the different communication models and visualize the results in
Table 6.2.
• DC-nets: Every participant has to send a DC-net message to each other participant.
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• ADC-nets: Every participant, except the RP, sends its ADC-net message to the RP. The RP
does not send its ADC-net message to itself over the network but just stores is locally. After
decrypting the published secret message, the RP sends it to its r recipients.
• ADC-nets with collision detection: In contrast to regular ADC-nets, the RP also sends the
published message to each other ADC-net participant for collision handling purposes.
Hereby, the amount of messages per round can be drastically reduced by using ADC-nets instead
of DC-nets, especially for larger communication groups.
Computation Overhead
Assume o as number of XOR operations which are executed for each round of communication.
We now compare o for the different communication models and visualize the results in Table
6.2.
• DC-nets: Every participant XORs its secret message with the round secrets it shares with
each other participant. Furthermore, every participant XORs all received ADC-net mes-
sages of the round.
• ADC-nets: Every participant XORs its secret message with the round secrets it shares with
each other participant. Only the RP XORs all received ADC-net messages of the round.
Hereby, the amount of XOR operations per round can be reasonably reduced by using ADC-nets
instead of DC-nets. While RPs execute the same amount of XOR operations as each participant
in a DC-net, the other ADC-net peers are relieved of decrypting a message for each round.
6.3 Group Setups
6.3.1 Approach
The group setup approach presented in Section 4.5.2 is designed to be comparably simple and
therefore easy to implement. To allow the improvement of the approach in future work, we
evaluate the impact of different group setup parameters on the following group setup properties:
• Total Path Length: the combined length of all random walks.
• Visited Peers: the number of peers visited by all random walks. Peers that are visited by
different random walks are counted
– (total) multiple times.
– (unique) only once.
• Participants: the number of peers recruited by all random walks. Peers that are recruited
by different random walks are counted
– (total) multiple times.
– (unique) only once.
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Table 6.3.: The group setup parameter settings used for evaluating the impact of the respective
parameter on the group setup properties presented in Section 6.3.1.
Parameter Used Settings
Number of Walks 1, 3, 5
Group Size Target 10, 20, 50
Participation Probability 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.99
Timeout None, 5, 10, 25
We desire a minimal total path length to only induce a minimal communication overhead while
achieving a certain number of participants. Therefore, the difference between visited peers
and participants should be minimal. Furthermore, when executing multiple random walks in
parallel, it is desirable that every peer/participant is only visited/recruited by one random walk
to prevent unnecessary communication overhead.
6.3.2 Experimental Setup
We used the group_setup_simulation script, which is presented in Section 5.4.3, for the simu-
lation of group setups with different configurations. We chose a number of settings for selected
parameters of the group_setup_simulation script and list them in Table 6.3. These settings
allow us to compare the impact of the parameters on the properties presented in Section 6.3.1.
We used a network with 1,000 peers and a degree of 4 for the simulations. This network was
generated using the network_generation script presented in Section 5.4.2. Furthermore, the
initiator of each group setup was randomly selected from all peers. We ran 10,000 simulations
for each combination of the parameter settings listed in Table 6.3, resulting in 144 different
combinations and 1,440,000 simulations in total.
6.3.3 Results
Our results are visualized as parallel coordinates in the Figures 6.1 to 6.4. For each Figure,
we focus on one group setup parameter. This parameter is visualized in the first axis of the
respective graph. The other axes show the group setup properties described in Section 6.3.1.
For each selected setting of the respective group parameter, the properties of each group setup
simulated for this parameter are averaged. For instance, each line in Figure 6.1 shows the
average of 1443 · 10,000 simulations. In the following sections, we evaluate the impact of each
parameter listed in Table 6.3 on the properties presented in Section 6.3.1.
Number of Walks
In Section 4.5.2, we proposed the use of multiple random walks as potential disruption coun-
termeasure and as way for reducing the power of individual adversaries that try to control a
considerable portion of the resulting group. We now evaluate the impact of using different
numbers of random walks in parallel by reference to Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1.: The impact of using different number of walk settings on the group setup properties.
As expected, the best results are achieved when using a single random walk. Here, it is known
at all times which peers have been visited and recruited. Hence, visited peers are only re-visited
when backtracking.
With an increasing number of random walks, the number of peers being visited by multi-
ple random walks also increases, hereby adding additional communication overhead. This is
a result of the different random walks not being coordinated. However, for a complete lack
of coordination, the percentage of peers/participants that are only visited/recruited by a single
random walk is relatively high. We expect that the performance can be further improved by
periodically exchanging information regarding the visited and recruited peers between the dif-
ferent random walks. While using multiple random walks is more complex, the opportunities
presented in Section 4.5.2 may outweigh the additional effort.
Group Size Target
Due to its impact on anonymity set size, group size is a central aspect of our group setup ap-
proach. We now evaluate the impact of using different group size target settings by reference to
Figure 6.2.
First, it can be seen that the respective group size target is exceeded for all settings. This is
the result of using multiple random walks without coordination. As no knowledge regarding
the recruited participants is shared between different random walks, each walk continues until
either the desired group size is reached or the walk times out. Therefore, the resulting group
size depends on all parameters listed in Table 6.3. They all have to be coordinated to achieve a
specific group size.
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Figure 6.2.: The impact of using different group size target settings on the group setup proper-
ties.
Participation Probability
We introduced the concept of capacity in Section 4.5.1 and use it as central aspect of our group
setup approach as presented in Section 4.5.2. For simplicity, we use the participation probability
parameter instead of simulating the capacity for each peer in the network. We now evaluate the
impact of using different participation probabilities by reference to Figure 6.3.
As expected, the participation probability has a direct effect on the ratio of visited peers to
participants. The higher the participation probability, the more visited peers are also recruited
as participants. This also explains the longer paths for lower participation probabilities as in av-
erage more peers have to be visited until the desired number of participants has been recruited.
We also observed this effect for our implementation of the group setup technique presented in
Section 4.5.2. As soon as a large majority of the peers had reached their capacity, the path
length drastically increased.
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Figure 6.3.: The impact of using different participation probability settings on the group setup
properties.
Timeout
In Section 4.5.2, we proposed the use of a timeout parameter as measure for preventing both
the recruitment of too many participants and the traversal of the whole network in case of only
few peers having capacities left. We now evaluate the impact of using different timeout settings
by reference to Figure 6.4.
As can clearly be seen, using no timeout drastically increases the total path length. This is
especially critical in scenarios where only very few peers have capacities left. Then, a large
portion of network is traversed. In the worst case, the whole network is traversed without
reaching the group size target, hence inducing a massive communication overhead without a
new group being formed successfully. We also observed this effect for our implementation of
the group setup technique presented in Section 4.5.2. Our results indicate that timeouts should
always be used.
There is clearly no timeout setting which is perfect for all scenarios. Too low settings result in
too few and too high settings in too many participants being recruited. Therefore, the timeout
setting has to be selected with regards to the other group setup parameters.
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Figure 6.4.: The impact of using different timeout settings on the group setup properties. The
None timeout setting is visualized as zero.
6.4 Rendezvous Point Elections
6.4.1 Approach
The RP election scheme presented in Section 4.4.1 is designed to randomly elect a leader from
a set of candidates. We evaluate whether a number of elections in the same network results
in a near-uniform distribution of leaders among all network peers. This is interesting in terms
of load balancing. Additionally, we evaluate the speed of elections for different group sizes by
comparing the following properties:
• mean drop-out rate: the mean percentage of candidates that are eliminated per election
round.
• number of rounds: the number of election rounds until a candidate is elected as RP.
RPs should be elected as fast as possible to reduce the duration of ADC-net setups. Therefore, a
high mean drop-out rate and a low number of rounds are desirable.
6.4.2 Experimental Setup
We used the batch_evaluation script, which is presented in Section 5.4.4, for running a num-
ber of comparable adc_net simulations for a selection of candidate set sizes.
64 6. Evaluation
Table 6.4.: Modified adc_net configuration options for running approximately 1,000 RP elec-
tions with c ∈ {10,20,50,100} candidates in a network with 100 peers.
Option Used Setting
group.capacity 10 · c
group.size.min c
group.size.target c
adc.enabled false
As most of the adc_net configuration options are irrelevant for RP elections, we rely on the
default settings listed in the Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 unless mentioned otherwise. We chose
c ∈ {10,20,50,100} as candidate set sizes. Furthermore, we decided to use networks with
100 peers for the simulation as this size is sufficient for the selected candidate set sizes. For
each simulation a new network was generated using the network_generation script presented
in Section 5.4.2. Apart from the number of network nodes, its default configuration, which is
listed in Table A.5, was used.
We modified a number of adc_net settings so that approximately 1,000 elections are executed
for each c. We can only approximate the number of elections as a number of groups may not be
set up successfully during our simulation, resulting in less than 1,000 groups in which elections
can be conducted. To reduce the simulation overhead, we disabled ADC-net functionality and
therefore stop the ADC-net logic after RP elections. We list the modified adc_net settings in
dependency to c in Table 6.4.
We ran each simulation for 150 seconds, resulting in 1,500 intervals at the default periodic
interval of 0.1. This duration was sufficient for more than 90% of the 1,000 elections being
conducted for each setting. Also, we executed 5 simulations for each c and averaged the results.
6.4.3 Results
Our results are visualized as distribution normal curves in the Figure 6.5 and as line plot in
Figure 6.6. In the following sections, we evaluate the impact of the different candidate set sizes
on the properties presented in Section 6.4.1.
Election Speed
Figure 6.5a clearly shows that the center of all mean drop-out rate distributions is located be-
tween 0.5 and 0.6. Hence, in average, more than half of the current candidates are eliminated
per round. This behavior can also be observed in Figure 6.5b. While elections with more can-
didates in general take longer than elections with less candidates, the number of additional
rounds is quite small when compared to the number of additional candidates.
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Figure 6.5.: Both (a) and (b) show the fast speed of RP elections.
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Figure 6.6.: Comparison of the uniform distribution and the distribution of leaders in the net-
work averaged for 4,000 elections.
Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of leaders in the network. It can clearly be observed that
the leader distribution approximates the uniform distribution. This indicates that the election
scheme presented in Section 4.4.1 indeed elects each ADC-net participant with equal probability
as RP.
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Table 6.5.: Modified adc_net configuration for running the ADC-net collision handling evalua-
tions for different wait probabilities wp ∈ {0.5,0.75,0.9}.
Option Used Setting
group.init_prob 0.001
adc.collision_handling.wait_prob wp
adc.transiency.enabled false
Table 6.6.: The different sender control mode settings used for the ADC-net collision detection
and ADC-net transiency simulations. Sender control modes are presented in Section
5.4.4.
(sender rate, send probability)
(0, 0)
(0.01, 0.05) (0.1, 0.05) (0.2, 0.05)
(0.01, 0.2) (0.1, 0.2) (0.2, 0.2)
(0.01, 0.5) (0.1, 0.5) (0.2, 0.5)
6.5 ADC-net Collision Handling
6.5.1 Approach
As presented in Section 5.3.7, we implemented a straightforward collision handling technique
to allow the use of multiple senders per ADC-net. While we do not focus on collision handling in
the theoretical part of this thesis, we still evaluate the impact of different sender control modes,
which are presented in Section 5.4.4, on the following aspects:
• the percentage of non-empty messages that are published in the ADC-net.
• the percentage of collisions for these non-empty messages.
• the mean delay of messages that are tracked using the sender_control message tracking
functionality presented in Section 5.3.7.
6.5.2 Experimental Setup
We used the batch_evaluation script, which is presented in Section 5.4.4, for running a
number of comparable adc_net simulations for different sender and collision handling con-
figurations. For each simulation, a new network with 1,000 peers was generated using the
network_generation script presented in Section 5.4.2 with its default configuration as listed in
Table A.5.
As in Section 6.4.2, we only modified few of the adc_net configuration options and relied on
the default settings listed in the Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 for the remaining options. We used
a group setup initialization probability of 0.001. Hereby, in average, one of the 1,000 peers
initiates a group setup for a new ADC-net per periodic interval. Due to the default group capacity
and group size settings, exactly 100025 = 40 ADC-nets, each comprising 25 peers, are set up for
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every simulation. With the specified group setup initialization probability, these 40 ADC-nets are
quickly set up. Hence, they all run over a comparable number of round, allowing us to compare
their properties. With transient behavior, some ADC-nets are not running continuously, hence
impacting the mentioned comparability. Therefore, we disabled transient ADC-net behavior.
To evaluate the impact of different numbers of senders and different numbers of messages
sent by each sender, we used the batch_execution sender control modes listed in Table 6.6.
We ran each simulation for 500 seconds, resulting in 5,000 intervals at the default peri-
odic interval of 0.1. With a default ADC-net interval coefficient of 10, up to 500 rounds of
ADC-net communication could be observed for this configuration. We executed 3 simulations
for each combination of the sender and the collision handling configurations, resulting in 30 dif-
ferent combinations and 90 simulations in total. We averaged the results for each configuration
combination over the 3 simulations executed for this combination.
6.5.3 Results
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Figure 6.7.: The percentage of non-empty messages increases with higher sender rates, higher
send probabilities and lower collision wait probabilities.
As expected and observed in Figure 6.7a, the number of non-empty messages being published
in ADC-nets increases with a higher sender rate and a higher send probability. Furthermore, it
can be observed that non-empty secret messages are also published if the sender rate is zero.
This is due to the use of interest control messages as presented in Section 4.5.3.
In Figure 6.7b, it is shown that higher wait probabilities result in fewer non-empty secret
messages being published in ADC-nets. This is expectable as the average wait time of each peer
that was part of a collision in an ADC-net is increased. Hereby, the number of non-empty secret
messages it can publish in the same ADC-net is reduced.
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Figure 6.8.: The percentage of collisions for non-empty messages increases with higher sender
rates, higher send probabilities and smaller collision wait probabilities.
Percentage of Collisions for Non-Empty Messages
In Figure 6.8a, it can clearly be observed that an increase in sender rate and send probability
increases the probability of published non-empty messages being part of a collision. Further-
more, the similarity of the results for the same sender rates and send probabilities of 0.2 and
0.5 should be noted. This indicates that a send probability of 0.2 is already too high as it results
in the same number of collisions as the much higher setting of 0.5.
In the last section, we showed that higher wait probabilities result in fewer non-empty secret
messages being published in ADC-nets. Now, we can observe in Figure 6.8b that high wait prob-
abilities result in a considerable reduction in the number of collisions when compared to smaller
probabilities. Hence, while more messages can be published with a smaller wait probability, this
is not necessarily positive as the majority of these messages is part of a collision and therefore
has to be sent again.
Mean Tracked Message Delay
Depending on the number of collisions in an ADC-net, secret messages may have to be sent
several times before they do not collide with other secret messages and thereby are successfully
published. This has a severe impact on the message delay as each peer has to wait for a certain
time before retransmitting secret messages that previously collided.
In the last section, we saw an increasing number of collisions for high sender rates and high
send probabilities. This also has a direct impact on the message delay as can clearly be ob-
served in Figure 6.9a. The same applies to our previous findings with regards to the number of
collisions for different wait probabilities and is displayed in Figure 6.9b.
Our results indicate that higher wait probabilities in general have a positive effect on the
number of non-empty secret messages that are successfully published in ADC-nets. Yet, we
expect that too high wait probabilities are counterproductive, especially with regards to message
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Figure 6.9.: Mean Tracked Message Delay
Figure 6.10.: The mean tracked message delay increases significantly with higher sender rates,
higher send probabilities and smaller collision wait probabilities.
delay. Therefore, it may be interesting to analyze the behavior over a longer period of time. We
leave this task to future work.
6.6 ADC-net Transiency
6.6.1 Approach
We presented transient behavior as a technique for reducing the continuous overhead induced
by ADC-nets in Section 4.4.3. We now analyze the impact of different sender modes and thresh-
old settings on the time until ADC-nets are disbanded. We measure this time by counting the
number of ADC-net communication rounds in the respective ADC-net until the transiency tran-
sition was initiated and refer to it as transition start round.
6.6.2 Experimental Setup
Table 6.7.: Modified adc_net configuration options for running ADC-net transiency simulations
for different transiency transition thresholds t t ∈ {10,30,50}.
Option Used Setting
group.init_prob 0.001
adc.transiency.transition.init_prob 1
adc.transiency.transition.threshold t t
The experimental setup used for the ADC-net transiency simulations is very similar to the
one presented in Section 6.5.2. Therefore, we only present the differences to the previously
presented experimental setup:
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• Transient ADC-net behavior was enabled.
• We used different ADC-net transiency transition thresholds instead of different ADC-net
wait probabilities.
• We used the default ADC-net wait probability as listed in Table A.3.
Furthermore, we also used 0.001 as group setup initialization probability so that both
1. the first 40 ADC-nets and
2. the ADC-nets that are created after one of the initial 40 ADC-nets has been disbanded
are quickly set up. This way, we can observe the behavior of a high number of ADC-nets in a
relatively short time span.
6.6.3 Results
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Figure 6.11.: The transition start rounds increase significantly with higher sender rates and send
probabilities and reasonably for higher transition thresholds.
In Figure 6.11a, we can observe that the transition start round increases for higher sender
rates and send probabilities. This was expected as our transiency approach disbands ADC-nets
when only empty messages have been published for a number of consecutive rounds.
It should be noted that the orange curve for the sender rate of 0.01 and the send probability
of 0.05 is an outlier. We expected it to be located between the blue and the green curve.
However, after analyzing the evaluation data for the simulations conducted with this setting
and comparing them to the other simulations, we can explain its occurrence: At a sender rate
of 0.01 and a send probability of 0.05, more ADC-nets were disbanded for higher transition
threshold settings than for higher sender rates and send probabilities. Therefore, the center of
the transition start round distribution for this setting is not as dense as expected. This outlier
shows that the different sender rates and send probabilities are only comparable to a certain
extent. Still, Figure 6.11a clearly indicates that sender rates and send probabilities have a
significant impact on the transition start rounds.
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In Figure 6.11b, it can be observed that higher transition thresholds increase the mean tran-
sition start round as we expected. Furthermore, we see that most of the transitions happen
comparably early. Yet, this may also be linked to the outlier problem mentioned before and has
to be evaluated further by running simulations over a longer timespan. We leave this task to
future work.
6.7 Research Questions
When we started with the research associated with this thesis, we formulated a number of
research questions which we wanted to address. We can now answer these questions and do so
in the following sections.
6.7.1 How to create the overlay without jeopardizing the identity of a sender?
In Section 4.5, we showed that RPs of ADC-nets can be used as proxies for overlay interactions.
Using this approach, senders cannot be linked to overlay initializations as they never directly
interact with overlays in their role as sender. Furthermore, we presented a technique for the
randomized periodic initialization of ADC-nets in Section 4.5.1. This technique prevents that a
sender intentionally, in its role as sender, initiates an ADC-net. This is important as otherwise,
adversaries could identify the initiator of an ADC-net as initiator of an overlay that is initialized
using the RP of the ADC-net as proxy.
6.7.2 How long does it take until an overlay for a set of interests is set up?
The following tasks have to be carried out before an overlay can be set up:
1. ADC-net Initialization: The ADC-net setup has to be randomly initiated by a peer, for in-
stance, using the approach presented in Section 4.5.1.
2. Group Setup: A number of participants for the new ADC-net have to be found, for instance,
using the approach presented in Section 4.5.2.
3. RP Election: A RP has to be elected for the ADC-net, for instance, using the approach
presented in Section 4.4.1.
4. ADC-net Cryptography Setup: Pair-wise master secrets have to be agreed upon as presented
in Section 2.6.1.
For our presented techniques, the group setup phase most likely has the longest duration due to
the distributed traversal of the network. The election phase instead is comparably short due to
the fast speed of the used election scheme as showed in Section 6.4. How long each phase takes
in a real-world environment is hard to estimate and depends on the specific implementation.
6.7.3 Is it always possible to create ADC-net overlays with a previously set number of
participants or is only a range of acceptable sizes practically feasible?
In Section 6.3, we showed that a previously set number of participants can be problematic to
achieve, especially when only few peers have capacities left for taking part in a new ADC-net.
72 6. Evaluation
Here, a range of acceptable group sizes should be used in combination with a group setup
timeout. This prevents the traversal of large portions of the network which would induce a
considerable communication overhead, especially for large networks. When assuming a network
in which most of the peers have enough capacities left for participating in a new ADC-net, a
previously set number of participants is also feasible.
6.7.4 How does the anonymity set size of ADC-nets compare to that of DC-nets?
Classical DC-nets comprise all peers and hence exhibit the maximum anonymity set size that
can be achieved in a network. ADC-nets in turn comprise a configurable number of peers,
when used as presented in Section 4.5, and therefore exhibit configurable anonymity set sizes.
Also, the anonymity set size of ADC-nets only applies to sender operations as they, in contrast
to classical DC-nets, do not protect receiver anonymity. Therefore, they can only be used for
sender protection.
A configurable anonymity set size is desirable as it allows the selection of different anonymity
set sizes for different use cases. For instance, communication with critical content can be pro-
tected by using larger anonymity sets at the cost of increased overhead.
6.7.5 How does the communication overhead of ADC-nets compare to that of DC-nets?
As presented in Section 6.2.2, ADC-nets induce significantly less communication overhead than
classical DC-nets, especially for a high number of DC-net/ADC-net participants. We summarize
our results assuming p ≥ 2 as number of DC-net/ADC-net participants, r as mean number of
recipients per round to which a RP has to forward a published message and m as the number of
messages sent for each round of communication:
• DC-nets: Every participant has to send a DC-net message to each other participant.
m= p · (p− 1)
• ADC-nets: Every participant, except the RP, sends its ADC-net message to the RP. After
decrypting the published secret message, the RP sends it to its r recipients.
m= (p− 1) + r
• ADC-nets with collision detection: In contrast to regular ADC-nets, the RP also sends the
published message to each other ADC-net participant for collision handling purposes.
m= 2 · (p− 1) + r
Our results show that ADC-nets can be used as more efficient sender protection component
than classical DC-nets. While ADC-nets with collision detection exhibit a higher communication
overhead than ADC-nets without collision detection, they still perform much better than classical
DC-nets.
6.7. Research Questions 73
6.7.6 How does the computational overhead of ADC-nets compare to that of DC-nets?
As presented in Section 6.2.2, ADC-nets induce considerably less computation overhead than
classical DC-nets. We summarize our results assuming p ≥ 2 as number of DC-net/ADC-net
participants, and o as the number of XOR operations executed for each round of communication:
• DC-nets: Every participant XORs its secret message with the round secrets it shares with
each other participant. Furthermore, every participant XORs all received ADC-net mes-
sages of the round.
o = p · (p− 1) + p · (p− 1)
• ADC-nets: Every participant XORs its secret message with the round secrets it shares with
each other participant. Only the RP XORs all received ADC-net messages of the round.
o = p · (p− 1) + p− 1
ADC-nets exhibit considerably reduced computational overhead when compared to classical
DC-nets. Each ADC-net participant, except the RP, only has to execute p − 1 XOR operations
while the RP has to execute 2 · (p− 1) XOR operations which is the same as each participant of
a classical DC-net.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Motivation
For privacy-friendly communication, the content of messages has to be protected. However,
the content of messages is not the only aspect of communication that is relevant for privacy. It
can already be critical if an adversary can identify the participants of a communication. Hence,
techniques for protecting the identity of communication participants are required. While a
number of feasible techniques exist for one-to-one communication, the ones that can be used
for many-to-many communication induce a significant overhead and hence are not scalable.
This is critical as many widespread technologies, e.g., social networks and the IoT, depend on
many-to-many communication.
7.2 Contributions
We presented a number of challenges that are associated with sender protection in P2P net-
works when using pub-sub overlays for scalable many-to-many communication. We introduced
ADC-nets as modified version of classical DC-nets with reduced overhead and maintained sender
anonymity guarantees. We presented a novel approach that uses intermediate ADC-nets with
configurable group sizes for sender protection. As part of this approach, we introduced a tech-
nique for forming suitable anonymization groups for a range of acceptable group sizes.
7.3 Results
We showed that ADC-nets, when compared to classical DC-nets with the same number of par-
ticipants, considerably reduce the overhead induced by CT while maintaining the anonymity
set size for send operations. As such, they can be used as more efficient component of sender
protection techniques than classical DC-nets.
Our approach prevents the leakage of sender-related information during
• the setup of ADC-nets for sender protection,
• sender-related overlay interactions and
• the sending of messages.
Hereby, adversaries cannot identify senders within the anonymity set of the respective ADC-net.
In addition to our group forming technique, we conducted an extensive evaluation regarding
the impact of several group setup parameters on selected group setup properties. Our results in-
dicate that desired group sizes can be achieved by closely coordinating the analyzed parameters.
We also show that a timeout should always be used for group setups to prevent the traversal of
large portions of the network and hereby a considerable communication overhead.
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7.4 Future Work
We now present a number of aspects that could be addressed in future work:
• Group Setup Coordination: We showed that the use of multiple random walks may in-
crease the disruption-resilience of group setups and also could restrict adversaries from
controlling a large portion of the resulting group. However, we also showed that using
multiple random walks can be problematic for larger groups when used without any coor-
dination. We expect that the use of periodic coordination between multiple random walks
can improve the performance of groups setups by preventing visiting/recruiting a peer
multiple times. Therefore, it may be interesting to evaluate how periodic coordination can
be realized and whether it has the expected effect.
• ADC-net Pausing and Disbanding: We presented pausing and disbanding of ADC-nets as
option to further reduce overhead. It may be interesting to evaluate the impact of different
pausing durations and disbanding thresholds on message delay and compare it to the
achieved overhead reduction. The results could then indicate which pausing durations
and disbanding thresholds are suitable for different use cases.
• Disruption Resilience: Disruption is a major problem that has to be addressed before our
approach can be used in a real-world application. It may be interesting to think about ways
to mitigate disruption by adversarial RPs, for instance, by periodically electing new RPs in
ADC-nets.
76 7. Conclusion
Acronyms
ADC-net Asymmetric Dining Cryptographers network
CLI command-line interface
CSPRNG cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
CT cover traffic
DC-net Dining Cryptographers network
DH Diffie-Hellman key exchange
ECC elliptic-curve cryptography
ECDH elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
GIL global interpreter lock
IoT Internet of Things
KDF key derivation function
LB Lightest Bin
MAC medium access control
MITM man-in-the-middle
Mix net Mix network
OTP one-time pad
P2P peer-to-peer
PKI public key infrastructure
pub-sub publish-subscribe
RP rendezvous point
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A Implementation Configuration Options
Table A.1.: Selection of adc_net main configuration options.
Option Description Type Default
mode The used main mode. str “simulation”
port The port used by all peers for the communica-
tion.
int 9000
periodic_interval The interval in seconds in which periodic tasks
are executed.
float 0.1
group Group Setup Settings, see Table A.2. object
adc ADC-net Settings, see Table A.3. object
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Table A.2.: The adc_net main configuration options regarding group setups.
Option Description Type Default
capacity The number of groups a peer can participate in simultaneously. int 1
init_prob The probability of a peer to initiate a group setup if its capacity
is not yet reached.
float 0.01
size.min The minimum number of participants for a group that are re-
quired for a setup to succeed.
int 25
size.target The desired number of participants for group setups. int 25
Table A.3.: The adc_net main configuration options regarding ADC-nets.
Option Description Type Default
enabled Whether ADC-net functionality is enabled. If dis-
abled, only group setups and RP elections are con-
ducted.
bool true
checksum Whether checksums are used for detecting collisions
that do not result in a malformed JSON format. Re-
quired for detecting interest collisions at the RP.
bool true
interval_coefficient The number of periodic intervals to wait between
ADC-net rounds.
int 10
msg_length The length of the ADC-net round messages. int 128
collision_handling.
enabled
Whether collision handling is enabled. bool true
collision_handling.
wait_prob
The probability which is checked every ADC-net
round by peers who were part of a collision in the
respective ADC-net and hence currently are in a wait
period. This period continues until the continuously
repeated probability check fails once.
float 0.9
transiency.enabled Whether transient behavior is enabled. bool true
transiency.transition.
duration
The duration of the transiency transition phase in
ADC-net rounds.
int 10
transiency.transition.
init_prob
The probability with which the transition is initiated.
It is checked each round in which the threshold is
reached.
float 0.5
transiency.transition.
threshold
The threshold that has to be reached before the
ADC-net can be disbanded. Counted in number of
consecutive rounds in which no non-empty ADC-net
message has to be sent over the ADC-net.
int 30
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Table A.4.: The adc_net peer configuration options.
Option Description Type
peer.addr The IP address of the communication interface used for com-
munication with other peers.
str
peer.neigh The IP addresses of adjacent neighbor peers. list of str
peer.interests The topics in which the peer is interested. list of str
Table A.5.: The configuration options for the network_generation script.
Option Description Type Default
nodes The number of generated network
nodes.
int 1000
degree The mean node degree. float 4
mode The configuration export mode. str "simulation"
network The network which is used for address
allocation for the nodes.
str "127.0.0.0/8"
interests_list The list of potential interests. list of str ["a", "b", ..., "z"]
interests_min The minimum number of interests
added to each node.
int 0
interests_add_prob The probability for adding more inter-
ests when the minimum number of in-
terests is reached. Interest are added
subsequently until the check fails.
float 0.25
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Table A.6.: The configuration options for the sender_control script.
Option Description Type
addr The address of the addressed peer. str
port The port of the addressed peer. int
interval The interval in which the addressed peer appends a
message to the send queue if the msg_add_prob check
succeeds. This setting is used as coefficient of the
periodic_interval parameter from the adc_net main
configuration.
int
msg_add_prob The probability with which a message is added to the send
queue. It is checked each interval.
float
msg_number The number of messages that are appended to the send
queue before the sender control task is finished.
int
msg_candidates A list of potential messages. Each message that is appended
to the send queue is randomly selected from this list.
list of str
msg_tracking Whether tracking information is added to send messages.
This information is used for the evaluation to determine
the delay of messages.
flag
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